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Abstract 
In this thesis, we designed and implemented a new covert channel over the RTP protocol.  
The covert channel modifies the timestamp value in the RTP header to send its secret 
messages.  The high frequency of RTP packets allows for a high bitrate covert channel, 
theoretically up to 350 bps.  The broad use of RTP for multimedia applications, including VoIP, 
provides plentiful opportunities to use this channel.  By using the RTP header, many of the 
challenges present for covert channels using the RTP payload are avoided.   
Using the reference implementation of this covert channel, bitrates of up to 325 bps were 
observed.  Speed decreases on less reliable networks, though message delivery was flawless 
with up to 1% RTP packet loss.  The channel is very difficult to detect due to expected variations 
in the timestamp field and the flexible nature of RTP. 
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1. Introduction 
A covert channel provides discrete communications using data in motion as its carrier.  A 
covert channel is hidden within a legitimate communications channel, and seeks transmission 
without detection of the channel’s existence.  This project will develop a covert channel using 
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) used during a Voice over IP (VoIP) call as the carrier.  The 
high frequency of packets for multimedia communications using RTP (such as VoIP) makes it an 
attractive carrier for a covert channel.    This covert channel will utilize the least significant bits 
of the timestamp in the protocol header to deliver its message rather than delivering it in the 
payload.  By using the protocol header, the channel provides for broad applicability by ignoring 
many of the codec issues encountered in the payload.  A sample implementation of the covert 
channel was also developed and experimental results taken. 
With VoIP communications, the focus is often on the signaling protocols used, such as SIP 
and H.323.  However, the signaling protocols actually form a small amount of the overall data 
traffic generated.   Rather, the most common protocol by frequency is RTP, which is used to 
carry the audio data.  RTP is used generically to carry multimedia for a number of streaming 
communications, including video and audio applications.  This broad application gives an RTP 
based channel uses beyond VoIP, allowing for even wider usage.   Prior research has focused on 
the payload, but the variable nature of the codecs used and possible re-encoding has been an 
issue.  By moving the channel to the protocol header, the payload associated issues are 
eliminated at the cost of decreased bandwidth. 
[4] 
 
The first section reviews similar literature and details how they relate to our design.    Next 
the design and methodology of the channel will be introduced.  Following that, the reference 
implementation and a discussion of the results will be presented.  Last, we will identify areas 
for future research and conclude. 
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2. Background 
 2.1   Prior Research 
Given the rising popularity of VoIP, a number of papers have addressed covert channels 
within a VoIP carrier.    Prior research has focused on embedding within the RTP payload rather 
than the header.  The payload has many traits that make it attractive: a large amount of data to 
embed within, noisy data source, and the ability to change the payload without obvious 
detection.  However, these existing channels have not been without problems. 
One issue that was encountered was the lack of reliability, as RTP uses UDP as its transport 
protocol.  To address this, protocols within the channel were used to increase reliability.  Druid 
[1] addressed this by providing his own minimalistic protocol to be used within the covert 
channel.  The author used simple protocol containing fields including checksum, type, length, 
and sequence fields.  He makes use of control messages separate from data messages as 
opposed to sending control messages with the covert data.  The design presented by Druid was 
effective, but could be costly in a low bandwidth channel. 
The RTP payload based covert channel was not without its problems.  One issue 
encountered by Druid [1] was the varying codecs that can be used within RTP, and can force a 
different solution for each codec encountered.  This made implementations specific to a 
particular setup.   Furthermore, codecs could be changed by media gateways, and the covert 
data could be lost by the re-encoding.   
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Another implementation of a covert channel in the RTP payload was presented by "An 
assessment of VoIP covert channel threats" [2].  The authors sought to use VoIP, in particular 
the RTP payload, to embed a secondary data stream hidden from obvious detection.  They also 
developed a performance evaluation framework to be able to quantify the threats to users.  
They found that covert channels are well-supported within a VoIP carrier channel, and 
suggested that detection of these covert channels is possible.  An implementation was also 
provided, showing the ability to embed a secondary voice stream in a RTP stream.  However, 
they did little to address the major issues of reliability and integrity across an unreliable 
medium.   
Other issues encountered with an RTP based covert channel include detectability and 
encryption.  In “An M-Sequence Based Steganography Model for Voice over IP” [3] the authors 
seek to provide a real time steganography design that resists detection.  They make use of the 
G.729 codec as a cover medium and established an m-sequence technique to hide the data.  A 
RSA-like key exchange provides for synchronization between the two endpoints.  The authors 
found that their techniques provided good security for transmitting covert data while 
maintaining the real time requirements of VoIP.    The real time requirements are important to 
consider, as only a minor processing delay can be afforded between both ends of the channel 
without becoming easily detectable by ear.  This was a novel approach but again focused on 
implementation in the RTP payload specifically using the G.711 codec. 
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Another implementation within a VoIP call was presented by “Covert channel for improving 
VoIP security” [4].  The authors sought to exchange information over VoIP using digital 
watermarking and steganography techniques to provide a covert channel, trying to provide a 
covert channel that could improve security of VoIP calls or provide bandwidth savings.  To 
provide their solution, the authors embedded watermarks and steganographic data to provide 
for authentication and integrity of the VoIP stream.  Control fields were embedded into the 
existing protocol headers, while the data were embedded within the voice stream.  However, 
the simple control information provided was embedded within available unused protocol 
headers, which is likely to increase detection.  The authors found that the covert data 
effectively improved the security of the VoIP communications by providing authentication and 
integrity, and noted that it could also be used for other applications.  This differs from our new 
covert channel as it focuses on improving security for the call versus just developing a covert 
channel.  They also have a less robust system for their data transmission.  However, the idea of 
using protocol headers for some control information is shared, though the approach differs 
notably. 
Other approaches have also been taken to use RTP as a covert channel.  “Hiding Data in 
VoIP” [5] compares steganographic techniques that can be used to introduce covert channels 
within VoIP and provides a brief description of these methods and their characteristics.  The 
primary method introduced makes use of both timing delays and modifying packet contents for 
a hybrid channel.  The idea is to use excessively delayed packets that are discarded to carry a 
load of covert data.  They found that this methodology provided relatively good cover against 
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detection, given normal delays of packets and resistance to statistical analysis.  This differs 
notably from our new covert channel, due to the use of timing delays and using large portions 
of packet payload rather than sending a small amount of data in packets that are accepted by 
the receiver. 
Another approach to a VoIP covert channel was using a full timing channel as presented in 
“Tracking Anonymous Peer-to-Peer VoIP Calls on the Internet” [6].  The authors investigated 
how watermarking can be used to track encrypted, peer to peer VoIP calls even in the presence 
of anonymizing networks.  To accomplish this, they presented a way to embed a watermark in 
the VoIP stream which could be used for identifying the stream using a timing based channel.  
The authors found that it was possible to make timing adjustments that were small enough to 
allow for proper VoIP communications while allowing for their covert signal to be received.  
They also found that low-latency anonymizing networks are vulnerable to timing based covert 
channels.  This solution only embedded a very small amount of data over the channel, but the 
persistence of timing across anonymizing networks is notable.  This timing channel shows an 
alternative solution to using the RTP payload, but is limited in its data transmission capability. 
A covert channel using the TCP timestamp was presented in “Covert Messaging Through 
TCP Timestamps” [7].  This channel carried 1bit in the least significant bit of the TCP timestamp 
by delaying the packet creation.  It is essentially a timing channel, with the timing change read 
from the timestamp value.  In TCP, the timestamp is only an option, making it easier to detect if 
a system does not usually use the option.  In contrast, RTP makes use of the timestamp in every 
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packet.  The TCP timestamp is set from the system clock, but has no set unit of measure (varies 
by operating system).  This variability works favorably for the channel, as it makes detection 
more difficult.  The data is obscured by an XOR against the 9th bit of the hash of the packet 
headers and the secret key, providing a simple yet reliable obfuscation method. 
TCP provides several benefits over UDP, including the ordering of segments and reliability of 
its payload. However, the header of the TCP segment does not share this reliable delivery.  In 
the case of a retransmission, the payload will be resent, but a new timestamp will be included.  
This means that the covert channel would need to watch for retransmissions of TCP and resend 
the lost data to take advantage of TCP’s reliability.  Instead, the authors send each bit multiple 
times to achieve reliable delivery.  However, this further reduces the available bandwidth, 
leaving the channel with a very limited bandwidth that could restrict its usefulness for many 
scenarios. 
2.2 RTP 
    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |V=2|P|X|  CC   |M|     PT      |       sequence number         | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                           timestamp                           | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |           synchronization source (SSRC) identifier            | 
   +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ 
   |            contributing source (CSRC) identifiers             | 
   |                             ....                              | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 1: RTP Packet Header. Source: RFC 3550 [8]. 
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The RTP packet header is shown in Figure 1 above.   The smaller sized fields in the header, 
covering the first 16 bits of the header, are expected to have specific values for an RTP header.  
This means that making changes to these fields could be easily detected.  Additionally, the small 
size of these first six fields greatly limits the amount of data that could be transmitted within 
them. The fields exceeding one byte in the RTP header are the sequence number, timestamp, 
SSRC, and CCRC.  The SSRC and CCRC have set values for a given data stream, making any 
modifications to these values obvious.  Also, the CCRC is often blank, and making any changes 
to an empty field is easily detectable.  The sequence number must increment by a value of one 
for each RTP packet and is used in loss detection, meaning that it cannot be modified either.  
However, the timestamp value does not require an exact number, but rather accepts a range, 
allowing our covert channel to be embedded there. 
It is important to understand the respective roles of the RTP timestamp and sequence 
number.  The timestamp is used to determine order of the packets for playback, and with jitter 
calculations.  If a high bitrate video is transmitted, it is possible for the timestamp to remain the 
same for several packets transmitting a single frame.  In contrast, the sequence number is used 
to detect RTP packet loss, as they only increase by one for each packet transmitted. [9] 
The timestamp in the RTP header is not derived from actual time values in most cases, but 
rather from the sample rate that is used by the codec in the RTP payload.  The most common 
sampling rate, 8 kHz, results in a timestamp increment of 160 for most codecs.  Similarly, a 
wideband 16 kHz sampling results in a timestamp increment of 320 per packet.  This is based on 
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the number of samples per frame, and with most codecs covering 20 ms/packet.  20/1000 ms * 
8000 Hz = 160 samples per frame.  Accordingly, the timestamp unit for 16 kHz wideband codecs 
is 16,000/50, which equals 320.  Units are not usually used in reference to the RTP timestamp, 
given its somewhat arbitrary nature, but are equivalent to samples/frame. Note that there is a 
special exception with G.722, which is actually 16,000 Hz but registered as 8,000 Hz by mistake 
in an RFC, so it actually uses a 160 increment instead of 320. [10] 
 
Accordingly, codecs with alternative sampling rates can affect the frequency at which RTP 
packets are sent, and their corresponding timestamp interval.  This means that the range 
available for covert channel use varies with the codec used.  Based upon common voice 
sampling rates, most codecs use a timestamp increment of 160 or 320, either of which would 
work using this new design.  If a codec were encountered which did not use a multiple of 160 in 
the timestamp, then modifications would have to be made to accommodate this.  By designing 
the channel to expect only a timestamp increment of 160, it increases its flexibility for being 
used with a wide variety of codecs at common voice sampling rates.   
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Name  Standardized by  Description  
Bit rate 
(kb/s)  
Sampling 
rate (kHz)  
Frame 
size (ms)  
(ADPCM) DVI  Intel, IMA  ADPCM  32  8  sample  
G.711  ITU-T  Pulse code modulation (PCM)  64  8  sample  
G.721  ITU-T  Adaptive differential pulse code modulation (ADPCM)  32  8  sample  
G.722  ITU-T  7 kHz audio-coding within 64 kbit/s  64  16  sample  
G.722.1  ITU-T  
Coding at 24 and 32 kbit/s for hands-
free operation in systems with low 
frame loss  
24/32  16  20  
G.723  ITU-T  
Extension of G.721 adaptive differential 
pulse code modulation to 24 and 40 
kbit/s for digital circuit multiplication 
equipment application  
24/40  8  sample  
G.723.1  ITU-T  
Dual rate speech coder for multimedia 
communications transmitting at 5.3 and 
6.3 kbit/s  
5.6/6.3  8  30  
G.726  ITU-T  
40, 32, 24, 16 kbit/s adaptive 
differential pulse code modulation 
(ADPCM)  
16/24/32/40  8  sample  
G.727  ITU-T  
5-, 4-, 3- and 2-bit/sample embedded 
adaptive differential pulse code 
modulation (ADPCM)  
var.  ?  sample  
G.728  ITU-T  Coding of speech at 16 kbit/s using low-delay code excited linear prediction  16  8     
G.729  ITU-T  
Coding of speech at 8 kbit/s using 
conjugate-structure algebraic-code-
excited linear-prediction (CS-ACELP)  
8  8  10  
GSM 06.10  ETSI  RegularPulse Excitation LongTerm Predictor (RPE-LTP)  13  8  22.5  
LPC10e (FIPS 
1015)  US Govt.  Linear-predictive codec  2.4  8  22.5  
Speex 
(narrowband) Xiph.org Open source codec based on CELP 2.15-24.6 8 20  
Speex 
(Wideband) Xiph.org Open source codec based on CELP 4-44.2 16,32 20 
A table of common codecs used in VoIP, with sampling rates shown.   
Sources: Henning Schulzrinne [11], speex.org [12] [13], IANA[14]. 
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3. A New Covert Channel over RTP 
3.1 Covert communications in RTP timestamp 
This project will modify the timestamp field in the RTP header and use it to transmit covert 
data.  For a regular voice stream sampled at 8000 Hz using G.711, the timestamp is 
incremented by 160 in each packet rather than incrementing by the actual time passed.  The 
160 is based on the expected time between packets based on the sample rate.  However, the 
numbering of the packets needs only to be in proper sequence to function properly at the 
receiving end.   
The G.711 codec was chosen as the reference point due to its standardized nature, high 
quality performance, and common usage in VoIP communications.  G.711 provides a high 
quality communications channel, using pulse code modulation at 8,000 Hz with 8 bits per 
sample for a 64 Kbit/s bit rate [15].  G.711 μ-law was used, as this is the version commonly used 
in North America.  G.711 is typically used for VoIP setups when bandwidth limitations are not 
an issue due to its high quality sound. 
Data can easily be embedded into the last seven bits based on standard VoIP sampling rate 
of 8 kHz without disturbing transmission.  Seven bits cover a range of 128 (0-127) in decimal, 
which is still below the value of 160 used for incrementing the timestamp.  With 50 packets 
transmitted per second, this provides a gross data rate of 350 bits per second full duplex, with 
less available dependent on network conditions, reliability protocols implemented, and needed 
level of covertness. 
[14] 
 
While this throughput is less than the 1000 bytes established in [1] using the RTP payload, 
this is to be expected given the limited size of the timestamp (4 bytes) as compared to the 
payload size with G.711 (160 bytes).  In addition, this new method makes use of a higher 
percentage of bits available in its respective field, using 21.9% of the field as opposed to the 
12.5% used in the payload of [1]. 
3.2 Challenges 
There are numerous challenges to making this covert channel successful.  The first is that the 
transport layer for RTP, UDP, is connectionless and unreliable.  It performs best effort delivery, 
but there is no retransmission of corrupt or missing data. Data may arrive out of order, corrupt, 
or not arrive at all.  Accordingly, to ensure reliable transit, our covert channel must provide its 
own mechanism. 
The next challenge is limitations imposed by cover size.  In our particular case, the RTP 
packet is composed of 32 bits of data.  Of those 32 bits, 7 can be safely used for the covert 
channel.  This small size per packet of this channel means that messages must be spread across 
multiple packets and reassembled properly at the other end.  The dependency on a high 
number of packets means that the threat of packet loss is multiplied, especially for delivering 
data intolerant of any loss.  It also means that efficiency is of the utmost importance, as there is 
little room for any overhead in the covert channel. 
Latency can also prove to be a challenge, given the real time nature of the application.  
Sensitivity to network latency is very noticeable on a phone call, as too much latency is easily 
noticed by end users and can render a call unusable.  This provides a challenge in that the 
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additional overhead from embedding and receiving message cannot delay RTP by much, or else 
the covertness is lost. 
The nature of the RTP streams can also prove to be problematic.  RTP uses two separate 
half-duplex streams, rather than a single, full-duplex stream.  The split nature makes tracking 
stream progress more difficult.  This means that both RTP streams must be correlated and used 
in support of the full-duplex solution for the covert channel.   
In addition to common RTP issues, there are also specific RTP Payload issues.  Payload based 
solutions suffer from compression issues, particularly with the lossy compression that is 
commonly used.  In addition, different audio codecs may require different approaches to work 
properly.  Also, media gateways may re-encode audio or otherwise modify the RTP payload, 
thereby resulting in data loss.  By using the timestamp, our covert channel largely bypasses 
codec issues.  However, since timestamp is derived from the codec sampling rate, any 
frequency that is not a multiple of 8,000 Hz could require some reworking. 
3.3 Characteristics of the Covert Channel 
This covert channel makes use of the timestamp of RTP for carrying the data, rather than 
being used in support of another carrier as was done in other covert channels.  In our 
implementation, the timestamp will pass accuracy checks, instead of failing checks to deliver a 
covert payload.  In addition, there is no dependency upon the rest of the header or the payload 
for the covert channel to function.  This simple approach makes it easier to implement reliably, 
with fewer bits of data that could potentially be in error. 
[16] 
 
3.3.1 Covertness  
This implementation is difficult to detect provided the channel is not already known.  The 
timestamp field is expected by most to contain actual timestamp values, which do not follow an 
exact pattern but rather contain some variability.  However, if it is known that the RTP 
timestamp used for a particular stream increments by a certain amount, detection could focus 
on looking for variations from this expected increment.  Such detection attempts could suffer 
from false positives, given the unreliable nature of UDP and the potential for datagram loss or 
disorder.  Furthermore, the particular usage of RTP needs to be identified in order to know the 
expected increment, including not only the application but the particular codec in use for that 
particular stream.  It is also difficult to see the data when examining packets, as the values are 
added to the timestamp as opposed to replacing the least significant bits.  Detection of covert 
channels based on RTP focuses on the payload manipulation, which is left untouched for this 
channel. 
The varying timestamps by codec also is advantageous as it makes it very difficult to detect 
manipulation of the timestamp.  Since even a single application (VoIP) makes use of a wide 
range of codecs, simply detecting that timestamps are not incrementing at a certain rate is not 
easily accomplished without very heavy and specific processing, based on every possible known 
codec.  This requires identification in the data stream of the codec used, which can be 
accomplished via the codes as detailed in RFC 3551 (G.711 ulaw is 0) [10].  However, knowledge 
of RTP usage and of the codec is required for this kind of detection to work.  Additionally, 
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newer codecs, such as speex, do not even have an assigned number for RTP payloads, further 
complicating detection. 
Another difficulty in detecting the RTP timestamp is that UDP is not reliable, meaning 
packets may be lost in transit.  This results in packets that appear to not follow a regular 
pattern.  In addition, it is possible for RTP streams to be reset during a call, resulting in the 
timestamp to be reset to a new start time.  Both of these aspects of the RTP stream add to the 
irregularity of the channel and impair detection. 
It can be difficult to even detect that RTP is in use.  UDP does not specify what kind of data 
is in its payload.  To be certain that RTP is in use, the start of the call must be captured, where 
the signaling protocol specifies a RTP transport.  Wireshark [16] is able to detect an RTP stream 
if it catches the call setup, but otherwise will display as only UDP.    When using the SIP 
protocol, the use of RTP is specified in the SDP in the message body of the SIP 200 (ok) packet 
(see Appendix 1).  If capturing packets after the call has started, they will also only show as UDP 
in Wireshark.  These issues mean that filtering for the channel faces many difficulties, especially 
since RTP need not use ports around 4000 as is customary.  Furthermore, if a packet capture is 
saved without the session initiation, the RTP packets will again only display as UDP.  The RTP 
header does not make it obvious it is in use, as the only static field is the first two bits, 
representing the RTP version.   With only two bits in use, there is a 1 in 4 chance that any 
packet will match that pattern, making it a very poor method.  Since it can be difficult to even 
detect RTP usage, looking inside of it for a covert channel becomes even more difficult. 
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There is also a matter of where the endpoints of the covert channel are in comparison to 
the RTP stream.  To detect the covert channel, one must be able to capture packets from a 
point where the covert channel is present.  By using a man in the middle approach, the covert 
data can be added after it leaves one client and stripped before it arrives to the other client.  
This means that at the end points, there is no evidence that the covert channel ever existed.  
Enterprise perimeters can only detect it if one of the covert channel interceptors is within their 
perimeter; otherwise, they are completely useless as well.  Granted this requires the covert 
operators to gain network access en route, but this is not an impossible task. 
The ease of detecting the channel also depends upon how much data is being transferred.  
The more data that is transferred, the more irregular the timestamp may appear.  While it is 
unlikely that the timestamp is examined in detail for the call, it is possible to do so.  Thus 
performing a large file transfer will create many modified packets, while a few lines of text sent 
back and forth modifies very few of the RTP packets.  More covert data packets also mean 
greater entropy in the timestamp increment, which could aid in detection. 
3.3.2 Reliability 
The channel is not particularly robust without further mechanisms being used to make it a 
reliable carrier.  This is because it is carried over a UDP carrier, as opposed to a reliable carrier 
such as TCP.  As such, part of the available bandwidth can be dedicated to a minimalistic 
protocol to improve the reliability and integrity of the messages.  However, given the limited 
bandwidth available, the channel may still experience reliability issues when faced with a highly 
disruptive channel.  In the reference implementation, transmissions functioned without error in 
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the majority of the tests, even with imperfect network transmissions.  The protocols used for 
increasing reliability are detailed within the experimental design section. 
3.3.3 Bandwidth 
The bandwidth of the channel is up to 7 bits per packet by 50 packets a second, for a total 
of 350 bits per second.  This max rate can be closely realized using the raw data transmission on 
a well-functioning local network.  When using the reliability protocol in the reference 
implementation, this rate was in the range of 60-130 bps. This drop in speed is largely 
dependent upon distance, as increased distance lengthens travel time for the packets and their 
acknowledgments.  The speed from the channel is still sufficient for text based communications 
and small file transfer, among other applications.  However, the speed from the reliability mode 
represents a significant drop from the raw data transmission rate. 
The main downfall of the reliability protocol used is that its acknowledgment system allows 
for only one piece of data to be sent before an ACK is received.  This greatly slows down the 
data transmission, as it needs to wait for the data to get to the receiver and for an ACK to travel 
back before any data transmission can occur.  During this round trip travel time, no additional 
data may be transmitted.  It is important to note that this is true for each direction independent 
of the other; each direction ACK and transmit is almost entirely independent of the other 
direction.  The only connection is that the ACK for one direction is sent before new data going 
the opposite direction.  While this seemingly could allow one sender to absorb all of the data 
transmission, in reality that is not the case.  The fact that only one piece of data is sent at a time 
in each direction provides for abundant unused packets, simply based on the time the data is 
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on the wire.  While this underutilizes bandwidth, it improves ordering and reliability of the 
stream. 
An alternative considered was to use error correction code to detect packet loss and 
perform data reconstruction rather than using an acknowledgment based system.  This would 
allow for higher speeds, with only a small amount of data being used for reliability, and put no 
holds on the data transmission rate.  This also runs the slight risk of packets arriving out of 
order, which is detrimental to data reconstruction.  While packets could be ordered based on 
the RTP sequence number, this further complicates this setup.  Also, this solution places no 
guarantees against data loss, though it is effective against periodic loss of a single packet.  
However, multiple packets missing in short sequence would result in lost data with no hope of 
recovery.  Given this shortfall, the acknowledging system was chosen instead. 
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4.  Experimental Design 
4.1 Methodology 
In order to transmit the data over the RTP stream, it first needs to be known the rate at 
which packets are sent.  This design focuses on RTP as used for VoIP application, but it could be 
used for other RTP streams as well.  With VoIP at 8000 Hz, the RTP timestamp increments by 
160 in each packet, with packets sent 50 times per second.  This means that up to 7 bits in the 
timestamp can be utilized to carry data for the channel (128 decimal). With roughly 50 packets 
per second, this provides a gross data rate of 350 bits per second.  It is unlikely that this full 
speed would be realized, as it is a theoretical maximum, expecting packets to be sent at an 
exact speed of 50 packets per second with no data loss from end to end.  In reality, data loss, 
protocol overhead, and other miscellaneous factors tend to slow the data rate. 
As an alternative to the 7 bit transfer rate, a lower bit rate and / or introducing delays in 
transmitting data can increase the covert nature of the channel.  Since the lower 5 bits do not 
change with all codecs, any changes in those may be more conspicuous.  To counter this, use 
the 6th and 7th least significant bits avoids any simple detection of the channel while the data is 
in binary form.  These two bits correspond to the values 32 and 64 in decimal.  It also decreases 
the data rate and provides more order, which can decrease the entropy.  However, this greatly 
reduces the available bandwidth to the channel, and requires that data be spread out across 
more packets.  This method is best suited for situations were covertness is the highest priority. 
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To embed data for the covert channel, we take the timestamp value and add the value of 
the data to be transmitted, while subtracting any previously added value.  For example, 
transmitting the value “A” is prior_ts-last_mod+160+65, with prior_ts being the last timestamp, 
and last_mod being the last timestamp modification used.  This means that all necessary 
tracking of prior values is done by the sender, not the receiver, simplifying the process and 
avoiding the two RTP streams issues.  It also means that, even with no additional reliability, the 
channel can communicate even in the result of packet loss.  In order to keep the timestamp 
close to the expected value, removal of the previously transmitted value must be removed 
from the timestamp.  This allows for the timestamp to stay closer to the actual value, thereby 
helping to avoid detection and potential software malfunction. 
To decode the data, modular arithmetic is used.  It is performed as x mod(160), where x is 
the timestamp received. This simplifies decoding and allows for reading the covert data even 
when experiencing packet loss.  This method also supports random start points, provided the 
implementation uses the proper timestamp increment when choosing the start point.  If a 
particular implementation does not do so, it is necessary to run the modular arithmetic above 
after subtracting the initial timestamp value. 
There are numerous models under which this covert channel could be implemented.  It can 
be added to a VoIP client, run as a standalone application on one of the computers a call is 
placed from, or run as a proxy/man in the middle.  In addition to these modes, any combination 
thereof would work, as they all communicate to each other in the same fashion.  What differs is 
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where the covert data is added and removed from the RTP stream, and the access required to 
use them. 
The reference implementation was integrated into a softphone package that can serve as 
the basis for many other applications.  This allowed for easy testing and demonstration of the 
project, as well as insight into the operation of the phone.  By placing the channel in a common 
softphone, detection of the software would prove more difficult than an additional process on 
a local computer, and would not require the same kind of privileged access to use.  However, 
the ultimate for covertness is man in the middle, provided proper network access can be 
obtained (and that is the difficult part).  Use as a softphone also provides for the least latency, 
as there is no additional packet capturing and formation over that of the phone call.  This is 
under the assumption that all implementations are written in languages and run on platforms 
with similar execution times.  Also, UDP checksums need to be recomputed for a man in the 
middle implementation, adding further overhead.   
 
Figure 2: The covert channel being run on the endpoint computers, either as a standalone application or built 
into a softphone. 
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Figure 3: The covert channel being used via proxy servers. 
The reference implementation was tested against several common codecs.  All of the 
codecs used worked without issue with the covert channel.  Most of the testing was performed 
against G.711, which uses a timestamp increment of 160 and is considered the baseline for 
quality voice audio.  Other codecs used include G.722, which is actually 16,000 Hz but 
registered as 8,000 Hz by RFCs, and actually uses 160 as its increment.  Speex, an open source 
solution, was used at 16,000 Hz, giving it a timestamp increment of 320.  GSM, running at 8 kHz 
and a timestamp increment of 160, also performed admirably.  The only major codec not tested 
with the implementation was G.729, which operates at 8 kHz and is heavily compressed.  G. 729 
is patent encumbered and considered costly, and accordingly was not included in the open 
source softphone that the reference implementation was built upon. 
4.2 Minimalistic protocol for communications 
In support of enabling communications using the RTP covert channel, a minimalistic 
protocol can be utilized to improve robustness of the channel.  While UDP provides a checksum 
to verify the integrity of the data it carries, it does not guarantee delivery of data. Similarly, RTP 
provides sequence numbering for ordering packets, but does not guarantee reliable delivery 
either.  Accordingly, what is needed for the covert channel is its own reliable transport protocol 
for use when packet loss is an issue or assured delivery is required. 
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In the case of a softphone implementation of the channel, the phone software is relied 
upon for verifying the UDP checksum.  In other implementations, this would need to be 
performed by the covert channel implementation.  In addition, depending on the protocol used, 
the implementation may need to check the RTP sequence numbering or timestamp to ensure 
proper ordering of the packets. 
4.2.1 Simple Acknowledgment 
In this implementation, a very simple acknowledgment (ACK) and retransmission system 
was used to improve reliability.  Flowcharts of transmission and receiving with this protocol are 
shown in Appendices 2 and 3.  When a packet is transmitted, a flag is set by the transmitter to 
not transmit again until an ACK is received.  A two second timer begins to count as well, and if 
this is exceeded without receiving an ACK, the last piece of covert data is retransmitted.  On the 
receiving end, when data is received (anything that is not an ACK or mod 160), a flag is set that 
an ACK needs to be transmitted in the next packet sent.  Once this ACK is sent, the receiver can 
resume sending its next piece of data, provided it has received an ACK for its last piece of data.   
The two second retransmission delay was meant to ensure adequate time for 
acknowledgments were provided.  The buffer delay is only approximately 120 ms, but this came 
into effect on receipt of the data and receipt of the ACK, plus the time on the wire in both 
directions.  It is likely that one second would suffice in most circumstances, but this could risk 
premature timeouts and make data collection difficult.  This increased timer length can cause 
longer delays on noisy connections, but has no impact on speed unless retransmissions are 
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needed.  For the reference implementation, it was preferable to eliminate premature timeouts 
as an issue. 
In order to mitigate retransmissions due to lost ACKs, two ACKs are now sent in short 
sequence, with two different code values (see Appendix 4). This is meant to prevent 
retransmission of properly received data, resulting in duplicate data when an ACK is dropped.  
Since it is considered more likely for two subsequent packets to be lost than two non-
sequential, the second ACK is transmitted in the second RTP packet after the first ACK.  This also 
helps by making the channel more covert, as two sequential timestamp adjustments are easier 
to detect than two non-sequential packets.  To avoid mistaking the second ACK as an ACK for 
new data, it is ignored if first ACK was received.  The second ACK can be clearly identified since 
it has the sequence number of the first ACK + 2.  If a second ACK is received that is not the prior 
ACK +2 in sequence, then it is used for the acknowledgment. 
Integrity is provided for by the UDP checksum, which covers all of the data in its payload as 
well (including the RTP header).  If the UDP checksum is valid, the datagram is kept and the RTP 
timestamp processed.  If the UDP checksum is invalid, it is simply discarded, and a 
retransmission will occur if data was present in the header.  No signaling goes back on a 
discard, since there is no way to determine if covert data was actually carried within that RTP 
packet or not. 
Another available option is to send a packet before a retransmission, signaling that the next 
packet is retransmitted data.  This could be effective in helping avoid duplicate data being 
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received, but it runs the risk of further complications with the retransmit packet itself being 
lost.  In the reference implementation, this part of the protocol was not implemented. 
Originally, the idea was to create a reliable system that was virtually flawless.  However, 
given the small amount of space per packet, and chance of packet loss, a perfect solution was 
not devised for packet loss exceeding 1%.  With more available space, one could reply back with 
the sequence number of a corrupted or lost packet, or note the sequence number a 
retransmission was sent to replace.  However there is not that much space, even without 
transmitting any additional data, and spanning multiple packets would prove too unreliable for 
a reliability protocol. 
4.2.2 Doubling 
An alternative method considered is to limit the character set to base 64, and allow 
doubling to represent 64 bit retransmissions of the corresponding data.  By doing this, it is easy 
to determine if the data sent should be accepted or not, based on whether an acknowledgment 
was sent or not and comparison to the last received data.  If the retransmission is different than 
the last received, it should be kept and acknowledged.  If it is the same, it may or may not be a 
duplicate, and still must be acknowledged.  The default behavior is to presume it is a duplicate 
and discard it, though there is a chance that the original data was lost, and not the ACK.  The 
likelihood of the ACK or data packet being lost is the same, but there is only theoretically a 1 in 
64 chance that the second piece of data matches the first.  Overall, there is a 1 in 128 chance of 
a duplicate occurring from this when a packet is lost.  As such, this solution attempts to address 
the issue, but will not be entirely reliable in all cases. 
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On codecs using a longer timestamp interval (such as 320 when sampled at 16 kHz), another 
modification can be used to improve reliability while maintaining a larger amount of data to 
transmit.  A similar doubling technique is used, but doubling the 128 basic ASCII values instead 
of base 64.  This provides an estimated 1 in 256 chance of duplication should a packet be lost in 
one direction, which is better than the base 64 solution as well.  However, this limits 
implementation to 16 kHz samplings when most voice is still sampled at 8 kHz, restricting its 
usefulness.  The wider variations in timestamp increment also increases entropy, thereby 
limiting covertness. 
4.2.3 Binary transfer 
Another method to address potential reliability issues focuses on the actual binary 
transmissions.  Instead of manipulating the timestamp value in decimal form, bits are 
manipulated directly.  Two control bits are used as the protocol header, with 5 bits available for 
data transmission per packet.  With roughly 50 packets per second, this provides a net data rate 
of approximately 250 bits per second and gross data rate of 350 bits per second.  Since the RTP 
protocol already provides a sequence number, separate sequencing is unnecessary.  The two 
bits are used to flag four different conditions:  new data, stop, acknowledgment (ACK), and 
retransmit, as detailed below. 
• New data:  signals new data sent in the payload. 
• Stop:  signals the end of a data block, or no new data to send.  This is sent in the 
packet after covert data was last transmitted in the payload.  Arrival means no data 
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is available for retrieval in the payload.  Regular timestamp data will be transmitted 
in the payload instead. 
• ACK: sent in reply to acknowledge last transmission.  Data is copied back to receiver 
for accuracy checking.  If ACK is not received by the sender after a set time, data is 
sent again. 
• Retransmit: set if ACK is not received within timer limit for acknowledging data.  
Payload contains last data transmitted. 
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5.  Reference implementation 
5.1 Implementation and environment 
To implement this design, existing open source programs were modified to write packets to 
communicate the covert data.  This was favored over starting from scratch, as it is redundant to 
start from scratch given the freely available software.  Integrating the channel into the phone 
software eliminates an extra process and executable file that may raise detectability on the end 
user system.  Additionally, this could minimize overhead for packet processing, since there is 
not the extra overhead of capturing and reforming packets.  Depending where the covert 
channel is implemented, it can even take advantage of the jitter buffer for ordering of packets.  
However, a standalone application would provide a more universal application, free of 
constraints of a particular softphone, and could even implement its own jitter buffer.  The 
current reference implementation was done in an existing softphone, though future versions 
will be done in standalone form as well. 
C was chosen as the programming language due to its portability and speed.  Java was 
looked at due to its ease of networking, but C offers faster execution and more low level access.  
In addition, stucts in C provide for an efficient and logical way for storing packet data. The 
major downside to C is that any GUI development is typically more heavily linked with 
particular operating systems than is Java. 
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5.1.1 Build Environment 
The reference implementation was designed to run on Windows XP and Windows Vista.  
Other versions of Windows may work but have not been tested.  The software was built in 
Visual Studio 2005, using the Visual C++ component.  The Windows Platform SDK is necessary 
for the build environment, and the Windows SDK for Windows Server 2008 and .NET 3.5 (SDK 
6.1) was used for the final versions of the implementation [17].  This allows for greatest 
compatibility with current Windows versions, including Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, 
Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008.  The DirectX SDK March 2009 was used for 
dependencies of its sound libraries [18].  The application may also build using Visual Studio 
2008, though this is not a supported environment for PJSIP.  Using Visual Studio 2005 and the 
newest version of PJSIP, the resulting program has been entirely stable, with no crashes 
occurring. 
In addition to the Windows version, another version (using the same code) was built for 
Linux.  This additional build was simple to do, as PJSIP includes make files for use with GCC on 
top of MS VC++ project files.  The Linux version was compiled on Fedora 11, running Linux 
kernel 2.6.29.6, GCC 4.4.0, and GLIBC 2.10.1.  These versions use an identical codebase, besides 
the parts that directly interface with OS API calls.  Both builds of the reference implementation 
worked in the same fashion, though testing focused on the Windows build.  The Linux build was 
primarily for showing that portability of the code works. 
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5.1.2 Base Project 
The reference implementation of the project was being built upon the sample 
implementation provided by pjsip.org [19].  The application, pjsua, provides a basic SIP client 
based upon libraries from the PJSIP open source project.  This provides an easy to use yet 
flexible VoIP application using SIP and RTP.  Part of the appeal of this client is that it does not 
require the use of a PBX but rather can perform direct, peer-to-peer calls, thereby simplifying 
testing.  However, it is also capable of placing and receiving calls by registering with a VoIP PBX.  
In testing, an Asterisk PBX was used as the soft PBX [20]. 
 
Figure 4: Media Flow of PJSIP [21].  
The media flow of the PJSUA client is shown above.  While all of the segments shown above 
are used in placing calls, the only parts involved in the covert channel are rtp.c and rtp.h (see 
appendices 7-9 for sources code).  Accordingly, the vast majority of the application is not even 
aware of the timestamp modification.  To further conceal the presence of the covert channel, 
the covert channel data is removed from the timestamp by rtp.c before heading to the rest of 
the application.  By doing so, the modifications made by the covert channel are seen by as little 
of the application as possible, and do not interfere with the jitter buffer or other components.  
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While leaving the covert data did not appear problematic to the rest of the application, taking 
extra precautions will, if anything, result in better quality. 
While removing the timestamp modification from the receiving end is not necessary for an 
implementation built into a phone client, it is more important when performing a man in the 
middle style operation.   When performing the channel using a standalone application or a 
proxy, resetting the timestamp to the expected value can prevent the end user from ever 
having a chance to detect the channel.  At first glance it seems that reverting timestamps could 
allow for a larger data amount sent per packet without disruption, but this requires the 
receiving end to track the last timestamp received (since modular 160 alone might give 
inaccurate results).  While this could be accomplished, the increased complexity and potential 
for packet loss puts the reliability of the channel at risk.  In addition, the covert channel would 
become easier to detect mathematically, given the larger fluctuations in timestamp increments.   
The reference implementation currently provides a framework for transmitting data in ASCII 
form.  Two main versions of the application were produced: one sending data without 
additional reliability mechanisms, and one following a basic protocol to improve reliability.  The 
version without the reliability protocol enabled relies on very low packet loss to ensure 
delivery, or that a message can be useful without receiving every last character (text based 
communications).  This “raw” version might work fine if the network connection is good along 
its entire length.  For data where no loss is acceptable, or on noisy networks, the reliability 
enhanced version should be used. 
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The reference implementation also relies on reading values from one text file, and writing 
received values to another text file.  This was done because the user interface was already 
crowded on the command line application, and it was not realistic to provide both reading and 
writing on the command line display.  This is an area where a GUI could lead to improvement.  
However, to demonstrate that the data is being transmitted, received data is printed to the 
console on top of being written to the file (see Appendix 6).  By default, these are named 
input.txt and output.txt, and should contain ASCII characters.   
Line encoding (UNIX or Windows) does not make a difference, as newline and carriage 
return are simply transmitted as is any other character, printable or not.  Since the characters 
are actually representative of an integer in C, the values can be read in as characters and added 
to the timestamp easily.  Similarly, writing the value out is simply a matter of determining the 
timestamp modification and writing that as a character to the file.  This keeps the process 
simple and efficient.  
There are two values that are swapped for reasons of keeping the channel covert while on 
the line, the Null character (0) and no data (128).  Since the desired effect is to have no 
timestamp modification when no covert data is sent, the value of 0 and 128 were swapped on 
the wire.  These swaps are transparent to the read and write operations, as swapping occurs 
after reading and before writing.   The decision was made to just move null rather than moving 
every character up by one for a range of (1-128) instead of (0-127), as this was considered more 
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efficient in processing.  Besides “no data”, the other special values transmitted are 130 and 131, 
which represent ACK 1 and ACK 2, respectively. 
To transfer binary files, they were first encoded in base 64 to ensure reliable transfer.  This 
is similar to the MIME encoding used in email, and is possible using a wide variety of tools.  As 
this results in sending a 6 bit character as a 7 bit character, 1/7th of the bits are wasted in this 
mode of transfer.  Binary data could be encoded as ASCII prior to transfer without the overhead 
of base 64, but tools are not as readily available to perform this task. 
The phone calls were placed using the modified version of PJSUA using the following 
configuration options for standard tests (see Appendix 6 for PJSUA main menu).  Note that the 
play-file and auto-play flags were not always set, depending upon the particular test conducted. 
 Command 
Calling Phone covert.exe sip:#.#.#.# --add-codec pcmu  --no-vad 
Receiving Phone covert.exe --play-file noise.wav --auto-answer 200 --auto-play --no-vad 
 
Covert.exe is the name of the executable file for the modified softphone.  Sip:#.#.#.# 
contains the IP address of the answering phone in place of the pound signs.  –add-codec pcmu 
specifies to place the call using G.711 U-law.  –no-vad ensures the phone sends RTP packets, 
even when silence is detected.   –auto-answer 200 has the phone receive calls automatically 
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and respond with SIP 200 (ok).  –play-file noise.wav has the phone play back a sound file, and –
auto-play has that sound file play back automatically when the call is established. 
Most of the experimental results were collected running two instances of the client, one 
running on Windows Vista SP2 and the second on a Windows XP SP3 virtual machine.  For 
thoroughness, tests for functionality were also run with a number of different XP and Vista 
machines at different locations, as well as Linux builds.  Data was captured using Wireshark for 
analysis.  In some instances, a sample noise file was used for the RTP data at one end, while in 
others microphones were utilized for both ends.  The X-Lite 3.0 softphone [22] was also used as 
a secondary receiver for testing purposes, and a Grandstream Budgetone 200 SIP phone was 
used as a simple hardware based client for testing call functionality.  However, all data rates 
and statistics were run from one covert client to another; other phones were used simply for 
interoperability testing.  Unless otherwise noted, the G.711 codec was used for the RTP payload 
with a sampling rate of 8000 Hz. 
For NY to IL tests, they were run between a Windows Vista SP2 machine and a Windows XP 
SP3 machine.  Both machines were behind home routers using NAT, and connected to the 
Internet using cable modems.  Both computers were connected to the LAN via 802.11G wireless 
networking.  This wireless networking provided another source of potential interference for 
these tests, as multiple computers were using the shared wireless medium at both ends.  
Sample statistics from pjsua for a NY to IL call is shown in Appendix 5. 
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For the tests involving packet drops, they were run from a laptop running Windows Vista 64 
bit to Windows Server 2008 64 bit.  The two machines were connected to a switch using gigabit 
Ethernet.  Percentage of RTP packets dropped was set on the application using the --tx-drop-
pct=% --rx-drop-pct=%, where % is the percentage of packets to drop in that direction.  
Percentage drops were performed at 1, 3, 5, and 10 percent, with the percentage being the 
same for both receiving and transmitting. 
Additional tests were performed XP to XP, Vista to Vista, and Linux to Vista, using various 
computers.  These tests were not performed for speed but rather to test functionality of the 
product across a number of different systems.  In all cases, the client was found to work 
identically regardless of the operating system used.  Speed and reliability data was not collected 
from tests using Linux. 
For the tests, the standard file used was a 1024 character block of ASCII text using Windows 
line endings.  This file was transmitted in full duplex.  While it is encoded in the file as 8 bits per 
character in ANSI for 256 possible characters, the ASCII character set records each character as 
only 7 bits for 128 possible values.  Accordingly, the calculations for speed are based on the 
number of character in the file multiplied by 7, rather than 8 as is stored on the disk.  This gives 
a more accurate representation of the data transmitted on the wire.  In addition to the 
standard 1024 character file, a 300 KB file was also transmitted on some local tests to check for 
the ability to send large files. 
[38] 
 
5.1.3 Alternative implementations 
In addition to the two primary versions of the reference implementation, two other versions 
were created.  The first is the original acknowledging system, which makes use of a single 
acknowledgment.  The one ACK mode, like the two ACK build, is designed to optimize reliability 
of the channel.  The second alternate mode increases covertness by modifying only the 6th and 
7th least significant bits of the timestamp (the 2 bit mode).  While this reduces the overall 
bandwidth, it avoids detection by not changing bits that are usually unmodified in the 
timestamp.  It also reduces the entropy of the overall channel.  Recall that the second main 
implementation is a raw transfer mode, which sends data without any acknowledging or 
reliability measures to maximize bandwidth.  This means there are the ACK based modes 
favoring reliability, the 2 bit mode favoring covertness, and the raw mode favoring bandwidth. 
 
Figure 5: Components to balance in a covert channel 
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Depending upon the situation, one of these may prove to be better than another.  For 
legitimate uses of a secondary stream, the acknowledging or raw modes should be used.  For 
maximizing covertness of the channel, 2 bit transfer mode should be used.  For maximizing 
bandwidth, the raw data mode is the best.  On networks with a small amount of loss, the 1 ACK 
mode works well, while on high loss networks the 2 ACK mode is optimal.  The type of data sent 
may also dictate whether speed, reliability, or covertness is most desirable. 
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6. Experimental results 
6.1 Initial Results 
Initial experimentation has focused on manipulating the RTP timestamps and its resiliency 
to this manipulation.  Based on initial experimentation, the timestamp can be manipulated 
within the expected range of 128 (7 bits) without any issues with receiving the voice stream.  In 
further experimentation, it was determined that changes to the timestamp beyond the 
increment of 160 could be used, provided that the results are sequential.  It is unclear whether 
this holds true for all phones, as it was only tested against a few phones available.  Values of up 
to 256 were used with G.711, with no detectable degradation in call quality. 
An example is shown in Figure 6 below, where the letter “A” (decimal 65) is embedded on 
the first packet of an RTP stream.  In decimal, the total value is 225; 160 for the regular 
implement, plus 65 for the letter.  During these transmissions, the audio reception was not 
impaired by this manipulation. 
 
Figure 6: An ASCII “A” is embedded into the timestamp in the first RTP packet.  The expected value of 160 has 
been replaced with 225. 
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Another experiment sought to add the new covert values to the timestamp without 
removing the previously used ones.  This resulted in the timestamp increasingly growing out of 
sync with the real timestamp value.  However, this also did not interrupt operations with the 
voice stream.  This suggests that the timestamp values at which packets are dropped are based 
on the last received value rather than the overall expected timestamp. 
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6.2 Current Results 
6.2.1 Speed 
 
Figure 7: Speed of the data transfer with various modes of the reference implementation 
 
Test Speed Tx (bps) Speed Rx (bps) 
XP to Vista local – 1 ack 128 128 
XP to Vista local – 2 ack 80 80 
XP to Vista local - Raw 325 325 
NY to IL – 1 ack 60 60 
NY to IL – 2 ack 68 68 
NY to IL - Raw 325 325 
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Figure 8: Speed of the data transfer using 2 ACKs at different amounts of packet loss 
 
Percent Dropped (both directions) Speed Tx (bps) Speed Rx (bps) 
1% 48  53 
3% 43 45 
5% 45 34 
10% 22 22 
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The speed of the application when running in the raw mode (without reliability protocol) 
was close to the expected theoretical maximum.  In tests, both local and from NY to IL, the 
speed transmission speed was 325 bps, compared to the theoretical maximum of 350 bps.  It is 
not entirely clear what caused this slight discrepancy though it not surprising that it does not 
exactly match the theoretical rate.  A minor change in timing of the packets could easily cause 
such a drop in rate. 
When using the reliability protocol, the speed was also good, though it dropped notably 
from the raw data rate.  When calling on a local network with the 2 ACK mode, speeds 
averaged 80 bps, while it dropped to 68 bps from NY to IL.  The drop in speed as distance 
increases is expected using the ACK based systems, as round trip time increases and packets 
must complete a round trip before new data is sent.  While this lower speed makes large data 
transfer impractical, small file transfer and two way text communications are easily 
accomplished. 
6.2.2 Reliability 
Test Reliability Tx Reliability Rx 
XP to Vista local – 1 ack Perfect Perfect 
XP to Vista local – 2 ack Perfect Perfect 
XP to Vista local - Raw Perfect Perfect 
NY to IL – 1 ack Perfect Perfect 
NY to IL – 2 ack Perfect Perfect 
NY to IL - Raw Perfect Perfect 
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Figure 9: Errors in received data for different amounts of packet loss 
 
Percent Dropped (both directions) Reliability Tx Reliability Rx 
1% Perfect Perfect 
3% 1024 to 1026 characters due 
to duplication 
1024 to 1025 characters due to 
duplication 
5% 1024 to 1025 characters due 
to duplication 
1024 to 1029 characters due to 
duplication 
10% 1024 to 1029 characters due 
to duplication 
1024 to 1030 characters due to 
duplications from lost ACKs 
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In early tests, 100% accuracy for a 1k files was obtained about 90% of the time.  When 
imperfections arose, it was duplicates of certain characters appearing due to lost ACKs.  To 
minimize this from single packet loss, the dual ACK system was implemented, which improved 
performance.  It was determined that the errors on the original local tests were due to running 
too many applications on the same computer rather than network loss, which at times delayed 
processing for the softphone.  The least reliable setup was operating between a guest and host 
OS on the same machine over the VMware NAT network, due to the load on a single system.  
This proved to drop numerous packets at times, which could result in a duplicate appearing in a 
file (typically 1 in 1000 characters or less). 
With the initial systems issues resolved, reliable transfers with no errors were repeatedly 
obtained over both the local network and across the public Internet.  Raw mode transmitted 
flawlessly on all local and remote tests.  It offered much faster data rates, with accuracy equal 
to the reliability mode.  Even in the NY to IL tests, the data transfer was found to be accurate 
when using the raw client.  The raw client also performed flawlessly on a local 300 KB test file.  
This persistence of the data indicates a quality Internet infrastructure in the northeastern US 
area and indicates that most calls could use the raw client as opposed to the more reliable one. 
The client performed without error with up to 1% data loss, but experienced problems with 
3% or higher loss.  In those cases, duplicates were sometimes problematic.  These results 
provided data that was easily readable for human communications, but could prove 
problematic the transferring of binary files.  On a network experiencing a very high amount of 
data loss, files requiring perfect duplication should not be transmitted with this client. 
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6.2.3 Covertness 
Overall the channel exhibited a high degree of covertness, making it difficult to detect.  This 
was mainly due to the flexible nature of the RTP protocol and operation of the RTP timestamp.  
In the clients performing acknowledgments, the covert data was spread over time rather than 
being sequential, making it harder to detect.  Acknowledgments also slow the rate at which 
data is sent, meaning many packets carry no data and use a default timestamp.  This means 
that a data carrying packet needs to be located first, which increases the difficulty of detection.  
However, the acknowledgments themselves create additional network traffic, which could aid 
detection. 
Attempts to view the covert channel proved difficult, even with knowledge of the covert 
channel.  Even with a packet capture from Wireshark, it can be hard to see the covert data.  
Without knowledge of the channel, nothing appears unusual in the RTP packets.  With 
knowledge of the channel, one must first find a data bearing packet, then determine the 
expected timestamp value, before being able to decode the data.  Even if detected, the end 
product can be hard to decipher, as one has no means of knowing whether or not the receiving 
client successfully read the last piece of data.  Without this knowledge, duplication could easily 
occur when attempting to decipher the stream. 
The jitter experienced with the rapid rate of packets also leads to detection problems.  Data 
on the wire may not arrive in the order it was sent, meaning the change in timestamps may be 
erratic on the wire.  To effectively process this data while looking for the channel, one needs a 
jitter buffer and to arrange packets based on sequence numbers.  
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Firewalls inspecting only layers one through four are unable to block the channel; only 
application level firewalls with specific knowledge of the covert channel can detect it, and even 
then not entirely reliably.  Applications firewalls properly configured for such a channel may 
potentially detect it, though they would face numerous challenges as detailed earlier.   
Mathematically the channel is hard to detect since the RTP timestamp field need not follow 
any particular pattern.  The RTP timestamp increment changes depending on protocol used for 
the RTP payload at that point in time, and may use system clock time.  Additionally, the fact 
that the timestamp may not increment between packets further complicates analysis, and 
could make it easy to get false positives.  In comparison, a payload based RTP covert channel 
may be detected by using mathematical steganographic analysis of payloads containing covert 
data. 
 
Transfer Mode Increment Entropy 
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2 bit 0.079072 
Raw 0.129782 
1 ACK 0.188215 
2 ACK 0.249292 
Entropy of the timestamp increment for different transfer modes, given a G.711 VoIP implementation 
 
[49] 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Entropy of the timestamp increment for G.711, for each of the different modes.  Low bandwidth and 
low reliability is the most covert.  Additional overhead from acknowledgments increases entropy.  1024 characters 
were sent on the covert channel out of 10,000 RTP packets for the above calculations. 
However, it is possible to detect the covert channel provided knowledge of the codec used 
and particular implementation is available.  This is done in one of two major ways: by looking 
for changes in the least significant bits of the timestamp, and by checking for entropy in the 
increment of the timestamp.  While the former is fairly simple, the later is complicated by the 
flexible nature of RTP, the variety of codecs, and the varying nature of the timestamp.  With 
knowledge of the expected timestamp value, one can detect variations in the incremental 
value.  The entropy, relative to the timestamp increment, was calculated using the following 
formula, where p is the probability of the value observed in the tests and b is the base of the 
algorithm: 
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In general, the entropy of the channel increases as more variations are performed to the 
timestamp.  To combat this, less data can be sent, and data can be sent over a longer period of 
time.  While neither of these will reduce the entropy of the timestamp increment to zero, they 
can reduce it to less noticeable levels.  However, the difficulties in determining the proper 
increment provide a layer of protection against such detection. 
It is also difficult for an end user to detect the covert channel’s presence.  Detecting the 
running process is tricky since it is a small portion of code integrated into the phone client.  End 
user detection by call operation or quality is also unlikely based on test results.  Out of five 
people rating call quality, none perceived any difference in call quality when the covert data 
was added.   
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7. Future work 
Future work will focus on further developing the reference implementation and 
strengthening the design of this covert channel.  The focus will be on attempting to ensure 
reliability while maintaining the highest possible data rate and lowest risk of detection.  Since 
these are somewhat competing objectives, a balanced medium needs to be established. 
A standalone version of this covert channel is also planned for later development.  The 
standalone version will allow for use with hardware phones, as well as with any soft client.  In 
addition, the standalone implementation will be able to perform man in the middle style 
communications on calls made by others.  The idea for this client is flexibility in use, allowing it 
to be used from a call endpoint or as an inline proxy. 
To help hide the data transmission, the traffic may be obfuscated by simple XOR operation 
against a pre shared key.  This increases entropy of the transmitted data, making it more 
difficult to decipher.  This also provides a weak way of indentifying a known sender, though not 
any particular sender and should not be relied upon.  A preamble may also be implemented at 
the beginning of a communications to indicate the sender. 
A graphical user interface will also be added to the reference implementation to provide for 
ease of use and to eliminate errors.  This interface will include the ability to transmit text and 
files across the channel and to view the results received.  Two boxes could be implemented, 
one for input and one for output.  In addition, files could be selected to be used for the input or 
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output.  Other options to tweak operations, such as enabling or disabling reliability mode, could 
also be implemented. 
The future outlook is good for this covert channel, as there is a growing trend towards 
increasing sampling rates to 16 kHz from 8 kHz, allowing for values up to 320 to be easily 
transmitted as opposed to 160.  This increased quality reflects better bandwidth availability and 
low processing costs with modern hardware.  In addition, VoIP and other RTP users are only set 
to continue to grow over time, increasing opportunities for usage almost anywhere at any time.  
Future research could also be conducted on the use of the additional data stream provided 
by the covert channel for more overt usages.  For example, phones could be configured to 
exchange additional information during a phone call with no additional packet creation or 
bandwidth used.  Data similar to that contained in RTCP packets could be embedded into the 
RTP itself.  The key benefit in this scenario is the bandwidth saving, and would likely be used 
with protocols such as G.729 where attempts to conserve bandwidth are already in use.  The 
additional transmitted data could also provide diagnostic information, perhaps similar to RTCP 
without the additional associated network traffic. 
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8. Conclusion 
We have shown the ability to transmit and receive data using a new covert channel over 
RTP, without interrupting the reception of the voice stream.    This reference implementation 
shows that this covert channel can be practically implemented and used.  Speed was shown to 
be sufficient for two-way text based communications and small file transfer.  Reliability was 
also shown to be good, if not always perfect.  The ability to detect this channel was also seen to 
be difficult, given the many packets involved and the way RTP operates.  Future work will 
further develop this reference implementation with increased reliability, flexibility, and 
usability. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  SIP/SDP Call Setup 
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Appendix 2: Transmit Flow Chart 
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Appendix 3: Receive Flow Chart 
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Appendix 4:  Dual acknowledgment packets 
 
Packet 232: 10.110.72.2 sends the value “84” (the letter “T”) 
Packet 234: 192.168.42.128 sends first acknowledgment 
Packet 235: 192.168.42.128 sends normal timestamp 
Packet 239: 192.168.42.128 sends seconds acknowledgment 
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Appendix 5: NY to IL Call Statistics 
    #0 PCMU @8KHz, sendrecv, peer=98.228.90.198:4000 
       RX pt=0, stat last update: 00h:00m:01.605s ago 
          total 1.8Kpkt 294.4KB (368.0KB +IP hdr) @avg=63.2Kbps/79.0Kbps 
          pkt loss=0 (0.0%), discrd=0 (0.0%), dup=0 (0.0%), reord=0 (0.0%) 
                (msec)    min     avg     max     last    dev 
          loss period:   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
          jitter     :   0.000   2.361  49.125   1.125   3.402 
       TX pt=0, ptime=20ms, stat last update: 00h:00m:01.557s ago 
          total 1.8Kpkt 297.2KB (371.6KB +IP hdr) @avg 63.8Kbps/79.8Kbps 
          pkt loss=2 (0.1%), dup=0 (0.0%), reorder=0 (0.0%) 
                (msec)    min     avg     max     last    dev 
          loss period:  20.000  20.000  20.000  20.000   0.000 
          jitter     :   0.000  19.688  26.000  22.250   7.696 
      RTT msec       :  58.425  87.409 151.000 143.000  61.722 
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Appendix 6: Reference Implementation 
 
Main Screen of application, using PJSUA 
 
 
Covert data being transferred while call in progress 
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Appendix 7: rtp.c source code (acknowledging) 
/* $Id: rtp.c 2394 2008-12-23 17:27:53Z bennylp $ */ 
/*  
 * Copyright (C) 2008-2009 Teluu Inc. (http://www.teluu.com) 
 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Benny Prijono <benny@prijono.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or 
 * (at your option) any later version. 
 * 
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
 * GNU General Public License for more details. 
 * 
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 
 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA  
 */ 
#include <pjmedia/rtp.h> 
#include <pjmedia/errno.h> 
#include <pj/log.h> 
#include <pj/sock.h> /* pj_htonx, pj_htonx */ 
#include <pj/assert.h> 
#include <pj/rand.h> 
#include <pj/string.h> 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <time.h> 
 
 
#define THIS_FILE   "rtp.c" 
 
#define RTP_VERSION 2 
 
#define RTP_SEQ_MOD (1 << 16) 
#define MAX_DROPOUT  ((pj_int16_t)3000) 
#define MAX_MISORDER  ((pj_int16_t)100) 
#define MIN_SEQUENTIAL  ((pj_int16_t)2) 
#define IN_FILE   "input.txt" 
#define OUT_FILE  "output.txt" 
#define DELAY_TIME  2 
#define SEND_DELAY  1 
FILE *infp;  //input file 
FILE *outfp; //output file 
time_t start_time; 
time_t cur_time; 
time_t call_start; 
 
 
static void pjmedia_rtp_seq_restart(pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *seq_ctrl,  
        pj_uint16_t seq); 
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PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_session_init( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses, 
           int default_pt,  
           pj_uint32_t sender_ssrc ) 
{ 
    PJ_LOG(5, (THIS_FILE,  
        "pjmedia_rtp_session_init: ses=%p, default_pt=%d, ssrc=0x%x", 
        ses, default_pt, sender_ssrc)); 
 
    /* Check RTP header packing. */ 
    if (sizeof(struct pjmedia_rtp_hdr) != 12) { 
 pj_assert(!"Wrong RTP header packing!"); 
 return PJMEDIA_RTP_EINPACK; 
    } 
 
    /* If sender_ssrc is not specified, create from random value. */ 
    if (sender_ssrc == 0 || sender_ssrc == (pj_uint32_t)-1) { 
 sender_ssrc = pj_htonl(pj_rand()); 
    } else { 
 sender_ssrc = pj_htonl(sender_ssrc); 
    } 
 
    /* Initialize session. */ 
    pj_bzero(ses, sizeof(*ses)); 
 
    /* Initial sequence number SHOULD be random, according to RFC 3550. */ 
    /* According to RFC 3711, it should be random within 2^15 bit */ 
    ses->out_extseq = pj_rand() & 0x7FFF; 
    ses->peer_ssrc = 0; 
     
    /* Build default header for outgoing RTP packet. */ 
    ses->out_hdr.v = RTP_VERSION; 
    ses->out_hdr.p = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.x = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.cc = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.m = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.pt = (pj_uint8_t) default_pt; 
    ses->out_hdr.seq = (pj_uint16_t) pj_htons( (pj_uint16_t)ses->out_extseq 
); 
    ses->out_hdr.ts = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.ssrc = sender_ssrc; 
 
    /* Keep some arguments as session defaults. */ 
    ses->out_pt = (pj_uint16_t) default_pt; 
 
 /* open files to read write */ 
 infp = fopen(IN_FILE, "r"); 
 outfp = fopen(OUT_FILE, "w+"); 
 
 //initalize covert values 
 ack_rcvd=1; 
 ts_mod_last=0; 
 ack_send=0; 
 ready_send=0; 
 time(&call_start); 
 retrans_rcv = 0; 
 retrans_send = 0; 
 ack2_send = 0; 
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    return PJ_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_session_init2(  
        pjmedia_rtp_session *ses, 
        pjmedia_rtp_session_setting settings) 
{ 
    pj_status_t status; 
    int   pt = 0; 
    pj_uint32_t  sender_ssrc = 0; 
 
    if (settings.flags & 1) 
 pt = settings.default_pt; 
    if (settings.flags & 2) 
 sender_ssrc = settings.sender_ssrc; 
 
    status = pjmedia_rtp_session_init(ses, pt, sender_ssrc); 
    if (status != PJ_SUCCESS) 
 return status; 
 
    if (settings.flags & 4) { 
 ses->out_extseq = settings.seq; 
 ses->out_hdr.seq = pj_htons((pj_uint16_t)ses->out_extseq); 
    } 
    if (settings.flags & 8) 
 ses->out_hdr.ts = pj_htonl(settings.ts); 
 
    return PJ_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
 
PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_encode_rtp( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
         int pt, int m, 
         int payload_len, int ts_len, 
         const void **rtphdr, int *hdrlen ) 
{ 
    PJ_UNUSED_ARG(payload_len); 
 
 //set prior ts modification value 
 if(ts_mod_old<160 && ts_mod_old>=(-1)){ 
 } 
 else{ 
  ts_mod_old=0; 
 } 
  
 //set ts_mod to zero in case no new data 
 ts_mod=0; 
 
 time(&cur_time); 
 
 //delay mechanism if needed at start.  disabled if readysend = (1) 
 if(ready_send==0){ 
  if(difftime(cur_time, call_start)>SEND_DELAY){ 
   ready_send=1; 
  } 
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 } 
 //take a pause from first ack 
 else if(ts_mod_old==130){ 
  ts_mod=0; 
  ack2_send=1; 
 } 
 //send second ack if first sent 
 else if (ack2_send==1){ 
  ts_mod=131; 
  ack2_send=0; 
 } 
 //check if need to send an ack 
 else if(ack_send == 1){ 
  ts_mod=130; 
  ack_send=0; 
 } 
 //check time since last transmit if no ack rcvd 
 else if((difftime(cur_time, start_time) >= DELAY_TIME) && 
(ack_rcvd==0)){ 
  ts_mod=ts_mod_last; 
 
  //reset timer start 
  time(&start_time); 
 } 
 //transmit new data if last recieved 
 else if(ack_rcvd == 1){ 
  //set timestamp modification for current packet 
  ts_mod=(getc(infp)); 
 
  //reset null to 128  
  if (ts_mod == 0) { 
   ts_mod=128; 
  } 
 
  //adjust if EOF. no ack for  
  if (ts_mod == -1){ 
   ts_mod=0; 
   ack_rcvd=1; 
  } 
  else if (ts_mod == 130){ 
   ack_rcvd=1; 
  } 
  else{ 
   //reset ack value 
   ack_rcvd=0; 
 
   //set timer start 
   time(&start_time); 
 
   //set transmitted value to last sent 
   ts_mod_last = ts_mod; 
  } 
 } 
 
 
    /* Update timestamp */ 
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    ses->out_hdr.ts = pj_htonl(pj_ntohl(ses->out_hdr.ts)+ts_len+ts_mod-
ts_mod_old); 
 
 //undo timestamp offset 
 ts_mod_old=ts_mod; 
 
 
 
    /* If payload_len is zero, bail out. 
     * This is a clock frame; we're not really transmitting anything. 
     */ 
    //if (payload_len == 0) 
 //return PJ_SUCCESS; 
 
    /* Update session. */ 
    ses->out_extseq++; 
 
    /* Create outgoing header. */ 
    ses->out_hdr.pt = (pj_uint8_t) ((pt == -1) ? ses->out_pt : pt); 
    ses->out_hdr.m = (pj_uint16_t) m; 
    ses->out_hdr.seq = pj_htons( (pj_uint16_t) ses->out_extseq); 
 
    /* Return values */ 
    *rtphdr = &ses->out_hdr; 
    *hdrlen = sizeof(pjmedia_rtp_hdr); 
 
    return PJ_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
 
PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_decode_rtp( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
         const void *pkt, int pkt_len, 
         pjmedia_rtp_hdr **hdr, 
         const void **payload, 
         unsigned *payloadlen) 
{ 
    int offset; 
 pj_uint32_t ts_diff; 
 pj_uint32_t ts_tmp; 
 
    PJ_UNUSED_ARG(ses); 
 
    /* Assume RTP header at the start of packet. We'll verify this later. */ 
    *hdr = (pjmedia_rtp_hdr*)pkt; 
 
    /* Check RTP header sanity. */ 
    if ((*hdr)->v != RTP_VERSION) { 
 return PJMEDIA_RTP_EINVER; 
    } 
  
 /*decode covert data*/ 
 ts_tmp = pj_ntohl((*hdr)->ts); 
 ts_diff=( ts_tmp % 160); 
 //record ACK 1 Recieved 
 if(ts_diff == 130){ 
  ack_rcvd=1; 
  ack_seq=pj_ntohs((*hdr)->seq); 
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  //printf("%d ",ack_seq); 
 } 
 //record ACK2 recieved in ACK one is not recieved 
 else if((ts_diff == 131) && (ack_rcvd==0) && (pj_ntohs((*hdr)-
>seq)!=(ack_seq+2))){ 
  ack_rcvd=1; 
  //putchar(33); 
 } 
 else if ((ts_diff < 129) && (ts_diff > 0)){ 
  if(ts_diff == 128){ 
   ts_diff=0; 
  } 
  putchar(ts_diff); 
  fputc(ts_diff,outfp); 
  ack_send=1; 
 } 
 //adjust timestamp to expected value for program to process 
 (*hdr)->ts = pj_htonl(ts_tmp-ts_diff); 
 //printf("%d",pj_ntohl((*hdr)->ts)); 
 
    /* Payload is located right after header plus CSRC */ 
    offset = sizeof(pjmedia_rtp_hdr) + ((*hdr)->cc * sizeof(pj_uint32_t)); 
 
    /* Adjust offset if RTP extension is used. */ 
    if ((*hdr)->x) { 
 pjmedia_rtp_ext_hdr *ext = (pjmedia_rtp_ext_hdr*)  
        (((pj_uint8_t*)pkt) + offset); 
 offset += (pj_ntohs(ext->length) * sizeof(pj_uint32_t)); 
    } 
 
    /* Check that offset is less than packet size */ 
    if (offset > pkt_len) 
 return PJMEDIA_RTP_EINLEN; 
 
    /* Find and set payload. */ 
    *payload = ((pj_uint8_t*)pkt) + offset; 
    *payloadlen = pkt_len - offset; 
 
    return PJ_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
 
PJ_DEF(void) pjmedia_rtp_session_update( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
      const pjmedia_rtp_hdr *hdr, 
      pjmedia_rtp_status *p_seq_st) 
{ 
    pjmedia_rtp_session_update2(ses, hdr, p_seq_st, PJ_TRUE); 
} 
 
PJ_DEF(void) pjmedia_rtp_session_update2( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
       const pjmedia_rtp_hdr *hdr, 
       pjmedia_rtp_status *p_seq_st, 
       pj_bool_t check_pt) 
{ 
    pjmedia_rtp_status seq_st; 
 
    /* for now check_pt MUST be either PJ_TRUE or PJ_FALSE. 
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     * In the future we might change check_pt from boolean to  
     * unsigned integer to accommodate more flags. 
     */ 
    pj_assert(check_pt==PJ_TRUE || check_pt==PJ_FALSE); 
 
    /* Init status */ 
    seq_st.status.value = 0; 
    seq_st.diff = 0; 
 
    /* Check SSRC. */ 
    if (ses->peer_ssrc == 0) ses->peer_ssrc = pj_ntohl(hdr->ssrc); 
 
    if (pj_ntohl(hdr->ssrc) != ses->peer_ssrc) { 
 seq_st.status.flag.badssrc = 1; 
 ses->peer_ssrc = pj_ntohl(hdr->ssrc); 
    } 
 
    /* Check payload type. */ 
    if (check_pt && hdr->pt != ses->out_pt) { 
 if (p_seq_st) { 
     p_seq_st->status.value = seq_st.status.value; 
     p_seq_st->status.flag.bad = 1; 
     p_seq_st->status.flag.badpt = 1; 
 } 
 return; 
    } 
 
    /* Initialize sequence number on first packet received. */ 
    if (ses->received == 0) 
 pjmedia_rtp_seq_init( &ses->seq_ctrl, pj_ntohs(hdr->seq) ); 
 
    /* Check sequence number to see if remote session has been restarted. */ 
    pjmedia_rtp_seq_update( &ses->seq_ctrl, pj_ntohs(hdr->seq), &seq_st); 
    if (seq_st.status.flag.restart) { 
 ++ses->received; 
 
    } else if (!seq_st.status.flag.bad) { 
 ++ses->received; 
    } 
 
    if (p_seq_st) { 
 p_seq_st->status.value = seq_st.status.value; 
 p_seq_st->diff = seq_st.diff; 
    } 
} 
 
 
 
void pjmedia_rtp_seq_restart(pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *sess, pj_uint16_t seq) 
{ 
    sess->base_seq = seq; 
    sess->max_seq = seq; 
    sess->bad_seq = RTP_SEQ_MOD + 1; 
    sess->cycles = 0; 
} 
 
 
[69] 
 
void pjmedia_rtp_seq_init(pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *sess, pj_uint16_t seq) 
{ 
    pjmedia_rtp_seq_restart(sess, seq); 
 
    sess->max_seq = (pj_uint16_t) (seq - 1); 
    sess->probation = MIN_SEQUENTIAL; 
} 
 
 
void pjmedia_rtp_seq_update( pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *sess,  
        pj_uint16_t seq, 
        pjmedia_rtp_status *seq_status) 
{ 
    pj_uint16_t udelta = (pj_uint16_t) (seq - sess->max_seq); 
    pjmedia_rtp_status st; 
     
    /* Init status */ 
    st.status.value = 0; 
    st.diff = 0; 
 
    /* 
     * Source is not valid until MIN_SEQUENTIAL packets with 
     * sequential sequence numbers have been received. 
     */ 
    if (sess->probation) { 
 
 st.status.flag.probation = 1; 
  
        if (seq == sess->max_seq+ 1) { 
     /* packet is in sequence */ 
     st.diff = 1; 
     sess->probation--; 
            sess->max_seq = seq; 
            if (sess->probation == 0) { 
  st.status.flag.probation = 0; 
            } 
 } else { 
 
     st.diff = 0; 
 
     st.status.flag.bad = 1; 
     if (seq == sess->max_seq) 
  st.status.flag.dup = 1; 
     else 
  st.status.flag.outorder = 1; 
 
     sess->probation = MIN_SEQUENTIAL - 1; 
     sess->max_seq = seq; 
        } 
 
 
    } else if (udelta == 0) { 
 
 st.status.flag.dup = 1; 
 
    } else if (udelta < MAX_DROPOUT) { 
 /* in order, with permissible gap */ 
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 if (seq < sess->max_seq) { 
     /* Sequence number wrapped - count another 64K cycle. */ 
     sess->cycles += RTP_SEQ_MOD; 
        } 
        sess->max_seq = seq; 
 
 st.diff = udelta; 
 
    } else if (udelta <= (RTP_SEQ_MOD - MAX_MISORDER)) { 
 /* the sequence number made a very large jump */ 
        if (seq == sess->bad_seq) { 
     /* 
      * Two sequential packets -- assume that the other side 
      * restarted without telling us so just re-sync 
      * (i.e., pretend this was the first packet). 
      */ 
     pjmedia_rtp_seq_restart(sess, seq); 
     st.status.flag.restart = 1; 
     st.status.flag.probation = 1; 
     st.diff = 1; 
 } 
        else { 
     sess->bad_seq = (seq + 1) & (RTP_SEQ_MOD-1); 
            st.status.flag.bad = 1; 
     st.status.flag.outorder = 1; 
        } 
    } else { 
 /* old duplicate or reordered packet. 
  * Not necessarily bad packet (?) 
  */ 
 st.status.flag.outorder = 1; 
    } 
     
 
    if (seq_status) { 
 seq_status->diff = st.diff; 
 seq_status->status.value = st.status.value; 
    } 
} 
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Appendix 8:  rtp.h source code 
/* $Id: rtp.h 2394 2008-12-23 17:27:53Z bennylp $ */ 
/*  
 * Copyright (C) 2008-2009 Teluu Inc. (http://www.teluu.com) 
 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Benny Prijono <benny@prijono.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or 
 * (at your option) any later version. 
 * 
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
 * GNU General Public License for more details. 
 * 
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 
 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA  
 */ 
#ifndef __PJMEDIA_RTP_H__ 
#define __PJMEDIA_RTP_H__ 
 
 
/** 
 * @file rtp.h 
 * @brief RTP packet and RTP session declarations. 
 */ 
#include <pjmedia/types.h> 
 
 
PJ_BEGIN_DECL 
 
 
/** 
 * @defgroup PJMED_RTP RTP Session and Encapsulation (RFC 3550) 
 * @ingroup PJMEDIA_SESSION 
 * @brief RTP format and session management 
 * @{ 
 * 
 * The RTP module is designed to be dependent only to PJLIB, it does not 
depend 
 * on any other parts of PJMEDIA library. The RTP module does not even depend 
 * on any transports (sockets), to promote even more use, such as in DSP 
 * development (where transport may be handled by different processor). 
 * 
 * An RTCP implementation is available, in separate module. Please see  
 * @ref PJMED_RTCP. 
 * 
 * The functions that are provided by this module: 
 *  - creating RTP header for each outgoing packet. 
 *  - decoding RTP packet into RTP header and payload. 
 *  - provide simple RTP session management (sequence number, etc.) 
 * 
 * The RTP module does not use any dynamic memory at all. 
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 * 
 * \section P1 How to Use the RTP Module 
 *  
 * First application must call #pjmedia_rtp_session_init() to initialize the 
RTP  
 * session. 
 * 
 * When application wants to send RTP packet, it needs to call  
 * #pjmedia_rtp_encode_rtp() to build the RTP header. Note that this WILL NOT 
build 
 * the complete RTP packet, but instead only the header. Application can 
 * then either concatenate the header with the payload, or send the two 
 * fragments (the header and the payload) using scatter-gather transport API 
 * (e.g. \a sendv()). 
 * 
 * When application receives an RTP packet, first it should call 
 * #pjmedia_rtp_decode_rtp to decode RTP header and payload, then it should 
call 
 * #pjmedia_rtp_session_update to check whether we can process the RTP 
payload, 
 * and to let the RTP session updates its internal status. The decode 
function 
 * is guaranteed to point the payload to the correct position regardless of 
 * any options present in the RTP packet. 
 * 
 */ 
 
#ifdef _MSC_VER 
#   pragma warning(disable:4214)    // bit field types other than int 
#endif 
 
 /** 
 * set values for covert channel 
 * old timestamp mod value 
 * mod value 
 * last mod value sent (for retrans) 
 * need to send ack 
 * ack was recieved for last 
 *  
 */ 
int ts_mod_old; 
int ts_mod; 
int ts_mod_last; 
int ack_send; 
int ack_rcvd; 
int ready_send; 
int retrans_rcv; 
int retrans_send; 
int ack_seq; 
int ack2_send; 
 
 
/** 
 * RTP packet header. Note that all RTP functions here will work with this 
 * header in network byte order. 
 */ 
#pragma pack(1) 
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struct pjmedia_rtp_hdr 
{ 
#if defined(PJ_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) && (PJ_IS_BIG_ENDIAN!=0) 
    pj_uint16_t v:2;  /**< packet type/version     */ 
    pj_uint16_t p:1;  /**< padding flag      */ 
    pj_uint16_t x:1;  /**< extension flag      */ 
    pj_uint16_t cc:4;  /**< CSRC count       */ 
    pj_uint16_t m:1;  /**< marker bit       */ 
    pj_uint16_t pt:7;  /**< payload type      */ 
#else 
    pj_uint16_t cc:4;  /**< CSRC count       */ 
    pj_uint16_t x:1;  /**< header extension flag     */  
    pj_uint16_t p:1;  /**< padding flag      */ 
    pj_uint16_t v:2;  /**< packet type/version     */ 
    pj_uint16_t pt:7;  /**< payload type      */ 
    pj_uint16_t m:1;  /**< marker bit       */ 
#endif 
    pj_uint16_t seq;  /**< sequence number      */ 
    pj_uint32_t ts;  /**< timestamp       */ 
    pj_uint32_t ssrc;  /**< synchronization source     */ 
}; 
#pragma pack() 
 
/** 
 * @see pjmedia_rtp_hdr 
 */ 
typedef struct pjmedia_rtp_hdr pjmedia_rtp_hdr; 
 
 
/** 
 * RTP extendsion header. 
 */ 
struct pjmedia_rtp_ext_hdr 
{ 
    pj_uint16_t profile_data; /**< Profile data.     */ 
    pj_uint16_t length;  /**< Length.      */ 
}; 
 
/** 
 * @see pjmedia_rtp_ext_hdr 
 */ 
typedef struct pjmedia_rtp_ext_hdr pjmedia_rtp_ext_hdr; 
 
 
#pragma pack(1) 
 
/** 
 * Declaration for DTMF telephony-events (RFC2833). 
 */ 
struct pjmedia_rtp_dtmf_event 
{ 
    pj_uint8_t event;     /**< Event type ID.     */ 
    pj_uint8_t e_vol;     /**< Event volume.     */ 
    pj_uint16_t duration;   /**< Event duration.    */ 
}; 
 
/** 
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 * @see pjmedia_rtp_dtmf_event 
 */ 
typedef struct pjmedia_rtp_dtmf_event pjmedia_rtp_dtmf_event; 
 
#pragma pack() 
 
 
/** 
 * A generic sequence number management, used by both RTP and RTCP. 
 */ 
struct pjmedia_rtp_seq_session 
{ 
    pj_uint16_t     max_seq;     /**< Highest sequence number heard     
*/ 
    pj_uint32_t     cycles;     /**< Shifted count of seq number cycles */ 
    pj_uint32_t     base_seq;     /**< Base seq number      
*/ 
    pj_uint32_t     bad_seq;        /**< Last 'bad' seq number + 1     
*/ 
    pj_uint32_t     probation;      /**< Sequ. packets till source is valid 
*/ 
}; 
 
/** 
 * @see pjmedia_rtp_seq_session 
 */ 
typedef struct pjmedia_rtp_seq_session pjmedia_rtp_seq_session; 
 
 
/** 
 * RTP session descriptor. 
 */ 
struct pjmedia_rtp_session 
{ 
    pjmedia_rtp_hdr     out_hdr;    /**< Saved hdr for outgoing pkts.   
*/ 
    pjmedia_rtp_seq_session seq_ctrl;   /**< Sequence number management.    
*/ 
    pj_uint16_t      out_pt; /**< Default outgoing payload type. */ 
    pj_uint32_t      out_extseq; /**< Outgoing extended seq #.     
*/ 
    pj_uint32_t      peer_ssrc;  /**< Peer SSRC.       
*/ 
    pj_uint32_t      received;   /**< Number of received packets.    
*/ 
}; 
 
/** 
 * @see pjmedia_rtp_session 
 */ 
typedef struct pjmedia_rtp_session pjmedia_rtp_session; 
 
 
/** 
 * This structure is used to receive additional information about the 
 * state of incoming RTP packet. 
 */ 
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struct pjmedia_rtp_status 
{ 
    union { 
 struct flag { 
     int bad:1;     /**< General flag to indicate that sequence 
is 
     bad, and application should not process 
     this packet. More information will be given 
     in other flags.       */ 
     int badpt:1;    /**< Bad payload type.       */ 
     int badssrc:1;  /**< Bad SSRC        */ 
     int dup:1;     /**< Indicates duplicate packet      
*/ 
     int outorder:1; /**< Indicates out of order packet      
*/ 
     int probation:1;/**< Indicates that session is in probation 
     until more packets are received.     */ 
     int restart:1;  /**< Indicates that sequence number has made 
     a large jump, and internal base sequence 
     number has been adjusted.      */ 
 } flag;      /**< Status flags.        */ 
 
 pj_uint16_t value;  /**< Status value, to conveniently address all 
     flags.         */ 
 
    } status;      /**< Status information union.      */ 
 
    pj_uint16_t diff;     /**< Sequence number difference from previous 
     packet. Normally the value should be 1.     
     Value greater than one may indicate packet 
     loss. If packet with lower sequence is 
     received, the value will be set to zero. 
     If base sequence has been restarted, the 
     value will be one.       */ 
}; 
 
 
/** 
 * RTP session settings. 
 */ 
typedef struct pjmedia_rtp_session_setting 
{ 
    pj_uint8_t      flags;     /**< Bitmask flags to specify whether such 
             field is set. Bitmask contents are: 
      (bit #0 is LSB) 
      bit #0: default payload type 
      bit #1: sender SSRC 
      bit #2: sequence 
      bit #3: timestamp      */ 
    int       default_pt;    /**< Default payload type.      
*/ 
    pj_uint32_t      sender_ssrc;   /**< Sender SSRC.       
*/ 
    pj_uint16_t      seq;     /**< Sequence.       */ 
    pj_uint32_t      ts;     /**< Timestamp.       */ 
} pjmedia_rtp_session_setting; 
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/** 
 * @see pjmedia_rtp_status 
 */ 
typedef struct pjmedia_rtp_status pjmedia_rtp_status; 
 
 
/** 
 * This function will initialize the RTP session according to given 
parameters. 
 * 
 * @param ses  The session. 
 * @param default_pt Default payload type. 
 * @param sender_ssrc SSRC used for outgoing packets, in host byte order. 
 * 
 * @return  PJ_SUCCESS if successfull. 
 */ 
PJ_DECL(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_session_init( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses, 
            int default_pt,  
            pj_uint32_t sender_ssrc ); 
 
/** 
 * This function will initialize the RTP session according to given 
parameters 
 * defined in RTP session settings. 
 * 
 * @param ses  The session. 
 * @param settings RTP session settings. 
 * 
 * @return  PJ_SUCCESS if successfull. 
 */ 
PJ_DECL(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_session_init2(  
        pjmedia_rtp_session *ses, 
        pjmedia_rtp_session_setting settings); 
 
 
/** 
 * Create the RTP header based on arguments and current state of the RTP 
 * session. 
 * 
 * @param ses  The session. 
 * @param pt  Payload type. 
 * @param m  Marker flag. 
 * @param payload_len Payload length in bytes. 
 * @param ts_len Timestamp length. 
 * @param rtphdr Upon return will point to RTP packet header. 
 * @param hdrlen Upon return will indicate the size of RTP packet header 
 * 
 * @return  PJ_SUCCESS if successfull. 
 */ 
PJ_DECL(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_encode_rtp( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
          int pt, int m, 
          int payload_len, int ts_len, 
          const void **rtphdr,  
          int *hdrlen ); 
 
/** 
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 * This function decodes incoming packet into RTP header and payload. 
 * The decode function is guaranteed to point the payload to the correct  
 * position regardless of any options present in the RTP packet. 
 * 
 * Note that this function does not modify the returned RTP header to 
 * host byte order. 
 * 
 * @param ses  The session. 
 * @param pkt  The received RTP packet. 
 * @param pkt_len The length of the packet. 
 * @param hdr  Upon return will point to the location of the RTP  
 *   header inside the packet. Note that the RTP header 
 *   will be given back as is, meaning that the fields 
 *   will be in network byte order. 
 * @param payload Upon return will point to the location of the 
 *   payload inside the packet. 
 * @param payloadlen Upon return will indicate the size of the payload. 
 * 
 * @return  PJ_SUCCESS if successfull. 
 */ 
PJ_DECL(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_decode_rtp( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
          const void *pkt, int pkt_len, 
          pjmedia_rtp_hdr **hdr, 
          const void **payload, 
          unsigned *payloadlen); 
 
/** 
 * Call this function everytime an RTP packet is received to check whether  
 * the packet can be received and to let the RTP session performs its 
internal 
 * calculations. 
 * 
 * @param ses     The session. 
 * @param hdr     The RTP header of the incoming packet. The header must 
 *      be given with fields in network byte order. 
 * @param seq_st    Optional structure to receive the status of the RTP 
packet 
 *      processing. 
 */ 
PJ_DECL(void) pjmedia_rtp_session_update( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
       const pjmedia_rtp_hdr *hdr, 
       pjmedia_rtp_status *seq_st); 
 
 
/** 
 * Call this function everytime an RTP packet is received to check whether  
 * the packet can be received and to let the RTP session performs its 
internal 
 * calculations. 
 * 
 * @param ses     The session. 
 * @param hdr     The RTP header of the incoming packet. The header must 
 *      be given with fields in network byte order. 
 * @param seq_st    Optional structure to receive the status of the RTP 
packet 
 *      processing. 
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 * @param check_pt  Flag to indicate whether payload type needs to be 
validate. 
 * 
 * @see pjmedia_rtp_session_update() 
 */ 
PJ_DECL(void) pjmedia_rtp_session_update2(pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
       const pjmedia_rtp_hdr *hdr, 
       pjmedia_rtp_status *seq_st, 
       pj_bool_t check_pt); 
 
 
/* 
 * INTERNAL: 
 */ 
 
/**  
 * Internal function for creating sequence number control, shared by RTCP  
 * implementation.  
 * 
 * @param seq_ctrl  The sequence control instance. 
 * @param seq     Sequence number to initialize. 
 */ 
void pjmedia_rtp_seq_init(pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *seq_ctrl,  
     pj_uint16_t seq); 
 
 
/**  
 * Internal function update sequence control, shared by RTCP implementation. 
 * 
 * @param seq_ctrl The sequence control instance. 
 * @param seq  Sequence number to update. 
 * @param seq_status Optional structure to receive additional information  
 *   about the packet. 
 */ 
void pjmedia_rtp_seq_update( pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *seq_ctrl,  
        pj_uint16_t seq, 
        pjmedia_rtp_status *seq_status); 
 
/** 
 * @} 
 */ 
 
PJ_END_DECL 
 
 
#endif /* __PJMEDIA_RTP_H__ */ 
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Appendix 9: rtp.c source code (raw) 
/* $Id: rtp.c 2394 2008-12-23 17:27:53Z bennylp $ */ 
/*  
 * Copyright (C) 2008-2009 Teluu Inc. (http://www.teluu.com) 
 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Benny Prijono <benny@prijono.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or 
 * (at your option) any later version. 
 * 
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
 * GNU General Public License for more details. 
 * 
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 
 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA  
 */ 
#include <pjmedia/rtp.h> 
#include <pjmedia/errno.h> 
#include <pj/log.h> 
#include <pj/sock.h> /* pj_htonx, pj_htonx */ 
#include <pj/assert.h> 
#include <pj/rand.h> 
#include <pj/string.h> 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <time.h> 
 
 
#define THIS_FILE   "rtp.c" 
 
#define RTP_VERSION 2 
 
#define RTP_SEQ_MOD (1 << 16) 
#define MAX_DROPOUT  ((pj_int16_t)3000) 
#define MAX_MISORDER  ((pj_int16_t)100) 
#define MIN_SEQUENTIAL  ((pj_int16_t)2) 
#define IN_FILE   "input.txt" 
#define OUT_FILE  "output.txt" 
#define DELAY_TIME  3 
#define SEND_DELAY  1 
FILE *infp;  //input file 
FILE *outfp; //output file 
time_t start_time; 
time_t cur_time; 
time_t call_start; 
 
 
static void pjmedia_rtp_seq_restart(pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *seq_ctrl,  
        pj_uint16_t seq); 
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PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_session_init( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses, 
           int default_pt,  
           pj_uint32_t sender_ssrc ) 
{ 
    PJ_LOG(5, (THIS_FILE,  
        "pjmedia_rtp_session_init: ses=%p, default_pt=%d, ssrc=0x%x", 
        ses, default_pt, sender_ssrc)); 
 
    /* Check RTP header packing. */ 
    if (sizeof(struct pjmedia_rtp_hdr) != 12) { 
 pj_assert(!"Wrong RTP header packing!"); 
 return PJMEDIA_RTP_EINPACK; 
    } 
 
    /* If sender_ssrc is not specified, create from random value. */ 
    if (sender_ssrc == 0 || sender_ssrc == (pj_uint32_t)-1) { 
 sender_ssrc = pj_htonl(pj_rand()); 
    } else { 
 sender_ssrc = pj_htonl(sender_ssrc); 
    } 
 
    /* Initialize session. */ 
    pj_bzero(ses, sizeof(*ses)); 
 
    /* Initial sequence number SHOULD be random, according to RFC 3550. */ 
    /* According to RFC 3711, it should be random within 2^15 bit */ 
    ses->out_extseq = pj_rand() & 0x7FFF; 
    ses->peer_ssrc = 0; 
     
    /* Build default header for outgoing RTP packet. */ 
    ses->out_hdr.v = RTP_VERSION; 
    ses->out_hdr.p = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.x = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.cc = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.m = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.pt = (pj_uint8_t) default_pt; 
    ses->out_hdr.seq = (pj_uint16_t) pj_htons( (pj_uint16_t)ses->out_extseq 
); 
    ses->out_hdr.ts = 0; 
    ses->out_hdr.ssrc = sender_ssrc; 
 
    /* Keep some arguments as session defaults. */ 
    ses->out_pt = (pj_uint16_t) default_pt; 
 
 /* open files to read write */ 
 infp = fopen(IN_FILE, "r"); 
 outfp = fopen(OUT_FILE, "w+"); 
 
 //initalize covert values 
 ack_rcvd=1; 
 ts_mod_last=0; 
 ack_send=0; 
 ready_send=0; 
 time(&call_start); 
 retrans_rcv = 0; 
 retrans_send = 0; 
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    return PJ_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_session_init2(  
        pjmedia_rtp_session *ses, 
        pjmedia_rtp_session_setting settings) 
{ 
    pj_status_t status; 
    int   pt = 0; 
    pj_uint32_t  sender_ssrc = 0; 
 
    if (settings.flags & 1) 
 pt = settings.default_pt; 
    if (settings.flags & 2) 
 sender_ssrc = settings.sender_ssrc; 
 
    status = pjmedia_rtp_session_init(ses, pt, sender_ssrc); 
    if (status != PJ_SUCCESS) 
 return status; 
 
    if (settings.flags & 4) { 
 ses->out_extseq = settings.seq; 
 ses->out_hdr.seq = pj_htons((pj_uint16_t)ses->out_extseq); 
    } 
    if (settings.flags & 8) 
 ses->out_hdr.ts = pj_htonl(settings.ts); 
 
    return PJ_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
 
PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_encode_rtp( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
         int pt, int m, 
         int payload_len, int ts_len, 
         const void **rtphdr, int *hdrlen ) 
{ 
    PJ_UNUSED_ARG(payload_len); 
 
 //set prior ts modification value 
 if(ts_mod_old<160 && ts_mod_old>=(-1)){ 
 } 
 else{ 
  ts_mod_old=0; 
 } 
  
 //set ts_mod to zero in case no new data 
 ts_mod=0; 
 
 time(&cur_time); 
 
 //delay mechanism if needed at start.  disabled if readysend = (1) 
 if(ready_send==0){ 
  if(difftime(cur_time, call_start)>SEND_DELAY){ 
   ready_send=1; 
  } 
 } 
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 //transmit new data if last recieved 
 else if(ack_rcvd == 1){ 
  //set timestamp modification for current packet 
  ts_mod=(getc(infp)); 
 
  //reset null to 128  
  if (ts_mod == 0) { 
   ts_mod=128; 
  } 
 
  //adjust if EOF. no ack for  
  if (ts_mod == -1){ 
   ts_mod=0; 
  } 
  else{ 
   //set transmitted value to last sent 
   ts_mod_last = ts_mod; 
  } 
 } 
 
 
    /* Update timestamp */ 
    ses->out_hdr.ts = pj_htonl(pj_ntohl(ses->out_hdr.ts)+ts_len+ts_mod-
ts_mod_old); 
 
 //undo timestamp offset 
 ts_mod_old=ts_mod; 
 
 
 
    /* If payload_len is zero, bail out. 
     * This is a clock frame; we're not really transmitting anything. 
     */ 
    //if (payload_len == 0) 
 //return PJ_SUCCESS; 
 
    /* Update session. */ 
    ses->out_extseq++; 
 
    /* Create outgoing header. */ 
    ses->out_hdr.pt = (pj_uint8_t) ((pt == -1) ? ses->out_pt : pt); 
    ses->out_hdr.m = (pj_uint16_t) m; 
    ses->out_hdr.seq = pj_htons( (pj_uint16_t) ses->out_extseq); 
 
    /* Return values */ 
    *rtphdr = &ses->out_hdr; 
    *hdrlen = sizeof(pjmedia_rtp_hdr); 
 
    return PJ_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
 
PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_rtp_decode_rtp( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
         const void *pkt, int pkt_len, 
         pjmedia_rtp_hdr **hdr, 
         const void **payload, 
         unsigned *payloadlen) 
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{ 
    int offset; 
 pj_uint32_t ts_diff; 
 pj_uint32_t ts_tmp; 
 
    PJ_UNUSED_ARG(ses); 
 
    /* Assume RTP header at the start of packet. We'll verify this later. */ 
    *hdr = (pjmedia_rtp_hdr*)pkt; 
 
    /* Check RTP header sanity. */ 
    if ((*hdr)->v != RTP_VERSION) { 
 return PJMEDIA_RTP_EINVER; 
    } 
  
 /*decode covert data*/ 
 ts_tmp = pj_ntohl((*hdr)->ts); 
 ts_diff=( ts_tmp % 160); 
 else if ((ts_diff < 130) && (ts_diff > 0)){ 
  if(ts_diff == 128){ 
   ts_diff=0; 
  } 
  putchar(ts_diff); 
  fputc(ts_diff,outfp); 
  ack_send=1; 
 } 
 //adjust timestamp to expected value for program to process 
 (*hdr)->ts = pj_htonl(ts_tmp-ts_diff); 
 
    /* Payload is located right after header plus CSRC */ 
    offset = sizeof(pjmedia_rtp_hdr) + ((*hdr)->cc * sizeof(pj_uint32_t)); 
 
    /* Adjust offset if RTP extension is used. */ 
    if ((*hdr)->x) { 
 pjmedia_rtp_ext_hdr *ext = (pjmedia_rtp_ext_hdr*)  
        (((pj_uint8_t*)pkt) + offset); 
 offset += (pj_ntohs(ext->length) * sizeof(pj_uint32_t)); 
    } 
 
    /* Check that offset is less than packet size */ 
    if (offset > pkt_len) 
 return PJMEDIA_RTP_EINLEN; 
 
    /* Find and set payload. */ 
    *payload = ((pj_uint8_t*)pkt) + offset; 
    *payloadlen = pkt_len - offset; 
 
    return PJ_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
 
PJ_DEF(void) pjmedia_rtp_session_update( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
      const pjmedia_rtp_hdr *hdr, 
      pjmedia_rtp_status *p_seq_st) 
{ 
    pjmedia_rtp_session_update2(ses, hdr, p_seq_st, PJ_TRUE); 
} 
[84] 
 
 
PJ_DEF(void) pjmedia_rtp_session_update2( pjmedia_rtp_session *ses,  
       const pjmedia_rtp_hdr *hdr, 
       pjmedia_rtp_status *p_seq_st, 
       pj_bool_t check_pt) 
{ 
    pjmedia_rtp_status seq_st; 
 
    /* for now check_pt MUST be either PJ_TRUE or PJ_FALSE. 
     * In the future we might change check_pt from boolean to  
     * unsigned integer to accommodate more flags. 
     */ 
    pj_assert(check_pt==PJ_TRUE || check_pt==PJ_FALSE); 
 
    /* Init status */ 
    seq_st.status.value = 0; 
    seq_st.diff = 0; 
 
    /* Check SSRC. */ 
    if (ses->peer_ssrc == 0) ses->peer_ssrc = pj_ntohl(hdr->ssrc); 
 
    if (pj_ntohl(hdr->ssrc) != ses->peer_ssrc) { 
 seq_st.status.flag.badssrc = 1; 
 ses->peer_ssrc = pj_ntohl(hdr->ssrc); 
    } 
 
    /* Check payload type. */ 
    if (check_pt && hdr->pt != ses->out_pt) { 
 if (p_seq_st) { 
     p_seq_st->status.value = seq_st.status.value; 
     p_seq_st->status.flag.bad = 1; 
     p_seq_st->status.flag.badpt = 1; 
 } 
 return; 
    } 
 
    /* Initialize sequence number on first packet received. */ 
    if (ses->received == 0) 
 pjmedia_rtp_seq_init( &ses->seq_ctrl, pj_ntohs(hdr->seq) ); 
 
    /* Check sequence number to see if remote session has been restarted. */ 
    pjmedia_rtp_seq_update( &ses->seq_ctrl, pj_ntohs(hdr->seq), &seq_st); 
    if (seq_st.status.flag.restart) { 
 ++ses->received; 
 
    } else if (!seq_st.status.flag.bad) { 
 ++ses->received; 
    } 
 
    if (p_seq_st) { 
 p_seq_st->status.value = seq_st.status.value; 
 p_seq_st->diff = seq_st.diff; 
    } 
} 
 
 
 
[85] 
 
void pjmedia_rtp_seq_restart(pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *sess, pj_uint16_t seq) 
{ 
    sess->base_seq = seq; 
    sess->max_seq = seq; 
    sess->bad_seq = RTP_SEQ_MOD + 1; 
    sess->cycles = 0; 
} 
 
 
void pjmedia_rtp_seq_init(pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *sess, pj_uint16_t seq) 
{ 
    pjmedia_rtp_seq_restart(sess, seq); 
 
    sess->max_seq = (pj_uint16_t) (seq - 1); 
    sess->probation = MIN_SEQUENTIAL; 
} 
 
 
void pjmedia_rtp_seq_update( pjmedia_rtp_seq_session *sess,  
        pj_uint16_t seq, 
        pjmedia_rtp_status *seq_status) 
{ 
    pj_uint16_t udelta = (pj_uint16_t) (seq - sess->max_seq); 
    pjmedia_rtp_status st; 
     
    /* Init status */ 
    st.status.value = 0; 
    st.diff = 0; 
 
    /* 
     * Source is not valid until MIN_SEQUENTIAL packets with 
     * sequential sequence numbers have been received. 
     */ 
    if (sess->probation) { 
 
 st.status.flag.probation = 1; 
  
        if (seq == sess->max_seq+ 1) { 
     /* packet is in sequence */ 
     st.diff = 1; 
     sess->probation--; 
            sess->max_seq = seq; 
            if (sess->probation == 0) { 
  st.status.flag.probation = 0; 
            } 
 } else { 
 
     st.diff = 0; 
 
     st.status.flag.bad = 1; 
     if (seq == sess->max_seq) 
  st.status.flag.dup = 1; 
     else 
  st.status.flag.outorder = 1; 
 
     sess->probation = MIN_SEQUENTIAL - 1; 
     sess->max_seq = seq; 
[86] 
 
        } 
 
 
    } else if (udelta == 0) { 
 
 st.status.flag.dup = 1; 
 
    } else if (udelta < MAX_DROPOUT) { 
 /* in order, with permissible gap */ 
 if (seq < sess->max_seq) { 
     /* Sequence number wrapped - count another 64K cycle. */ 
     sess->cycles += RTP_SEQ_MOD; 
        } 
        sess->max_seq = seq; 
 
 st.diff = udelta; 
 
    } else if (udelta <= (RTP_SEQ_MOD - MAX_MISORDER)) { 
 /* the sequence number made a very large jump */ 
        if (seq == sess->bad_seq) { 
     /* 
      * Two sequential packets -- assume that the other side 
      * restarted without telling us so just re-sync 
      * (i.e., pretend this was the first packet). 
      */ 
     pjmedia_rtp_seq_restart(sess, seq); 
     st.status.flag.restart = 1; 
     st.status.flag.probation = 1; 
     st.diff = 1; 
 } 
        else { 
     sess->bad_seq = (seq + 1) & (RTP_SEQ_MOD-1); 
            st.status.flag.bad = 1; 
     st.status.flag.outorder = 1; 
        } 
    } else { 
 /* old duplicate or reordered packet. 
  * Not necessarily bad packet (?) 
  */ 
 st.status.flag.outorder = 1; 
    } 
     
 
    if (seq_status) { 
 seq_status->diff = st.diff; 
 seq_status->status.value = st.status.value; 
    } 
} 
 
 
 
 
